Could you say a bit more about why the allow_negative flag, which was unique to Alameda accounts, is consistent with Levine’s references to borrowing “in the ordinary course of business . . . based on their crypto positions”? A special exception for a customer owned by FTX’s CEO, which allowed said customer to go over $10B in the red when no other customer was allowed a similar privilege, does not sound “in the ordinary course of business” to me. That doesn’t sound “based on their crypto positions” either.
Source for over $10B: this summary of recent testimony by an accounting professor in the trial. Also from the same source: “The main takeaway: from January 2021 all the way up until FTX’s (and Alameda’s) collapse on Nov. 11, 2022, all of Alameda’s “allow negative”-enabled accounts on the exchange were massively in the red. And despite this woeful state of affairs, it didn’t stop Alameda from paying out billions to meet its obligations.”
Could you say a bit more about why the allow_negative flag, which was unique to Alameda accounts, is consistent with Levine’s references to borrowing “in the ordinary course of business . . . based on their crypto positions”? A special exception for a customer owned by FTX’s CEO, which allowed said customer to go over $10B in the red when no other customer was allowed a similar privilege, does not sound “in the ordinary course of business” to me. That doesn’t sound “based on their crypto positions” either.
Source for over $10B: this summary of recent testimony by an accounting professor in the trial. Also from the same source: “The main takeaway: from January 2021 all the way up until FTX’s (and Alameda’s) collapse on Nov. 11, 2022, all of Alameda’s “allow negative”-enabled accounts on the exchange were massively in the red. And despite this woeful state of affairs, it didn’t stop Alameda from paying out billions to meet its obligations.”