I don’t think this is a point against valuing animal lives (to some extent) as much as it’s a point against utilitarianism. Which I agree with. I didn’t downvote because I don’t think a detailed calculation in itself is harmful, but when you reach these kinds of conclusions is probably the point to acknowledge pure utilitarianism might be a doomed idea.
I have some sympathy with that view, except that I think this is a problem for a much wider class of views than utiliarianism itself. The problem doesn’t (entirely) go away if you modify utilitarianism in various attractive ways like “don’t violate rights”, or “your allowed/obligated to favour friends and family to some degree” or “doing the best thing is just good, not obligatory. The underlying issue is that it seems silly to ever think you can do more good by helping insects than more normal beneficiaries, or that you can do more good in a galaxy-brained indirect way than directly, but there are reasonably strong theoretical arguments that those claims are either true, or at least could be true for all we know. That is an issue for any moral theory that says we can rank outcomes by desirability, regardless of how they think the desirability of various outcomes factors into determining what the morally correct action is. And any sane theory, in my view, thinks that how good/bad the consequences of an action are is relevant to whether you should do it, whether or not other things are also relevant to whether the action should be performed.
Of course it is open to the non-consequentialist to say that goodness of consequences are sometimes relevant, but never with insects. But that seems a like cheating to me unless they can explain why.
Thanks, Michael. I agree. For example, I estimate broiler welfare and cage-free campaigns decrease 1.95 M and 452 k arthropod-years per $, thus greatly increasing deaths nearterm, which I assume can easily be harmful from a perspective concerned about the right to life.
I guess some impartiality, “valuing animal lives (to some extent)”, is the key element of utilitarianism which is necessary for the conclusions of my post to hold. Which moral theory having impartiality as an element would imply different conclusions?
I don’t think this is a point against valuing animal lives (to some extent) as much as it’s a point against utilitarianism. Which I agree with. I didn’t downvote because I don’t think a detailed calculation in itself is harmful, but when you reach these kinds of conclusions is probably the point to acknowledge pure utilitarianism might be a doomed idea.
I have some sympathy with that view, except that I think this is a problem for a much wider class of views than utiliarianism itself. The problem doesn’t (entirely) go away if you modify utilitarianism in various attractive ways like “don’t violate rights”, or “your allowed/obligated to favour friends and family to some degree” or “doing the best thing is just good, not obligatory. The underlying issue is that it seems silly to ever think you can do more good by helping insects than more normal beneficiaries, or that you can do more good in a galaxy-brained indirect way than directly, but there are reasonably strong theoretical arguments that those claims are either true, or at least could be true for all we know. That is an issue for any moral theory that says we can rank outcomes by desirability, regardless of how they think the desirability of various outcomes factors into determining what the morally correct action is. And any sane theory, in my view, thinks that how good/bad the consequences of an action are is relevant to whether you should do it, whether or not other things are also relevant to whether the action should be performed.
Of course it is open to the non-consequentialist to say that goodness of consequences are sometimes relevant, but never with insects. But that seems a like cheating to me unless they can explain why.
I agree with David’s comment. These sorts of ethical dilemmas are puzzles for everyone, not just for utilitarianism.
And in the case of insect welfare, rights-based theories produce more puzzling puzzles because it’s unclear how to reckon with tradeoffs.
Thanks, Michael. I agree. For example, I estimate broiler welfare and cage-free campaigns decrease 1.95 M and 452 k arthropod-years per $, thus greatly increasing deaths nearterm, which I assume can easily be harmful from a perspective concerned about the right to life.
Hi Guy,
I guess some impartiality, “valuing animal lives (to some extent)”, is the key element of utilitarianism which is necessary for the conclusions of my post to hold. Which moral theory having impartiality as an element would imply different conclusions?