Thanks for that first point – I was using “naive utilitarianism” in a broader sense which I now realize made my point less clear. What I meant was that I worry about the type of thinking that allows for serious harm if it increases net welfare, e.g. disregarding rights violations so long as they lead to the greatest total good. I don’t disagree with your modelling, but worry more generally about reasoning which permits these other types of harm.
Your second point is fair and helps me understand your post better. Thanks for that!
I am not convinced of your third point. There are just so many insects in the world that I think it would be hard to improve their welfare on a large scale without some level of societal investment. However, until we have more research on insect welfare and related potential interventions, I think this one will be hard to resolve.
What I meant was that I worry about the type of thinking that allows for serious harm if it increases net welfare, e.g. disregarding rights violations so long as they lead to the greatest total good.
I worry about that too in some sense. On the other hand, I would not consider “serious harm” donating to organisations working on invertebrate welfare instead of ones working to help farmed vertebrates or humans. In addition, I wonder whether donating to organisations working on invertebrate welfare is better than to ones working on chicken welfare reforms from rights-based perspectives too. I estimate broiler welfare and cage-free campaigns decrease 1.95 M and 452 k arthropod-years per $, thus violating the right to life of lots of animals.
There are just so many insects in the world that I think it would be hard to improve their welfare on a large scale without some level of societal investment.
Rosenberg (2023) “found that there are ≈1 × 10^19 (twofold uncertainty range) soil arthropods on Earth, ≈95% of which are soil mites and springtails”. So looking into a few representative species of mites and springtails might be enough to have a good picture of the welfare of wild terrestrial arthropods.
Hi Vasco,
Thanks for that first point – I was using “naive utilitarianism” in a broader sense which I now realize made my point less clear. What I meant was that I worry about the type of thinking that allows for serious harm if it increases net welfare, e.g. disregarding rights violations so long as they lead to the greatest total good. I don’t disagree with your modelling, but worry more generally about reasoning which permits these other types of harm.
Your second point is fair and helps me understand your post better. Thanks for that!
I am not convinced of your third point. There are just so many insects in the world that I think it would be hard to improve their welfare on a large scale without some level of societal investment. However, until we have more research on insect welfare and related potential interventions, I think this one will be hard to resolve.
Thanks again for sparking this great discussion!
Thanks for the follow-up, Samuel!
I worry about that too in some sense. On the other hand, I would not consider “serious harm” donating to organisations working on invertebrate welfare instead of ones working to help farmed vertebrates or humans. In addition, I wonder whether donating to organisations working on invertebrate welfare is better than to ones working on chicken welfare reforms from rights-based perspectives too. I estimate broiler welfare and cage-free campaigns decrease 1.95 M and 452 k arthropod-years per $, thus violating the right to life of lots of animals.
Rosenberg (2023) “found that there are ≈1 × 10^19 (twofold uncertainty range) soil arthropods on Earth, ≈95% of which are soil mites and springtails”. So looking into a few representative species of mites and springtails might be enough to have a good picture of the welfare of wild terrestrial arthropods.
Thanks for the support, @Samuel Mazzarella 🔸!