Could you clarify why your methodology is supposed to apply to silkworms, but not nematodes? I agree nematodes have a less complex brain and nervous system, but silkworms are also less complex than other animals, so I do not understand how you are deciding when your methodology is supposed to be applicable. Did you preregister the animals to which you thought your methods should apply to?
My understanding is that estimating RPās mainline welfare ranges involved tens of judgement calls similar to the one you made to get the probability of sentience of nematodes. My broader point is that I do not know what majorly distinguishes nematodes from silkworms for you to think only the latter are reasonably covered by your methodology.
I had understood the estimates in the sheet which is no longer public were preliminary. However, it is still the case that the welfare range conditional on sentience under the pleasure-and-pain-centric model is proportional to the sum of the probabilities of the respective proxies being present? If so, for RPās probability of sentience of nematodes of 6.8 %, a single behavioural proxy likely to be absent results in a welfare range of nematodes conditional on the rate of subjective experience of humans of at least 2.31*10^-4 (= 0.068*0.00339), which both me and Nick consider high.
The conversion from qualitative probabilistic descriptions to probabilities adds uncertainty, but I do not think it the driver of disagreement. In my mind, and I guess Nickās, the major issue is that the effect of the presence of behaviours on the welfare range is not moderated by neural complexity. RPās mainline welfare ranges consider āone-ninth weight to the possibility that an organismās welfare range [conditional on sentience, and the rate of subjective experience of humans] is equal to the number of neurons it possesses relative to humansā. So an organism having 0 neurons only decreases its welfare range conditional on sentience, and the rate of subjective experience of humans by 1ā9. I understand having no neurons at all would also lead to a lower probability of sentience, but I think it should directly imply a much larger decrease in the welfare range conditional on sentience.
What is your best guess for the probability of sentience of nematodes? It could be lower than 6.8 %, but still very far from Pascalianly low. I think reasonable approaches to deal with meta-normative uncertainty (about how to aggregate the recommendations of different moral theories) should not dismiss a 6.8 % or slightly lower chance of causing huge amounts of suffering.
In the book, ā10 percent [weight is assined] to the equality modelā, under which the welfare range conditional on sentience is 1. So the final welfare ranges conditional on sentience are at least 0.1 (= 0.1*1). Do you endorse the estimates presented in Table 8.6 of the book over RPās mainline welfare ranges?
When Bob was selecting the species, he was thinking of adult insects as the edge cases for the model (bees, BSF). He included juveniles to see what the model implies, not because he really thought the model should be extended to them. Youāll notice that, in the book, the species list narrows considerably partly for this reason.
On the points related to sentience-conditioned welfare ranges, e.g. āSo an organism having 0 neurons only decreases its welfare range conditional on sentience, and the rate of subjective experience of humans by 1ā9. I understand having no neurons at all would also lead to a lower probability of sentience, but I think it should directly imply a much larger decrease in the welfare range conditional on sentience.ā I think itās a mistake to point to a hypothetical sentience-conditioned welfare range, which is an intermediate step in the calculations, for an animal that has zero neurons as indicative of an issue with the methodology overall for animals with complex brains.
Put straightforwardly, if an animal has zero neurons, it would have a welfare range of 0 overall, because I would give it a zero percent chance of being sentient, which affects all the models.
I also am not going to put a precise probability of sentience on nematodes, but I do think itās much much closer to zero and crosses the threshold of being Pascalās mugged.
Iām finding these discussions very draining and not productive at this point, so will not be engaging further in this debate.
I encourage you to disclaim in the post with RPās mainline welfare ranges that Bob does not think the methodology used to produce them is applicable to silkworms. In practice, what does this mean? Would it be reasonable to neglect beings to which your methodology is not supposed to apply? Why is the methodology applicable to black soldier flies (BSFs), but not silkworms? I understand a methodology can be more or less applicable, but I still do not understand which concrete criteria you are using. I also think the applicability of the methodology should ideally be taken into account in the estimates such that these are more comparable.
I suggest people account for the lower applicability of your methodology to less complex organisms by using welfare ranges equal to the geometric mean between RPās mainline welfare ranges, and the number of neurons as a fraction of that of humans. Does this seem reasonable?
I am not certain that neurons are required for an organism to have a non-constant welfare, so I think organisms without neurons have welfare ranges above 0. I guess you mean that organisms without neurons have a welfare range of roughly 0, but exactly how close to 0 matters. As I say in the post, āRounding to 0 a probability of sentience, or welfare per animal-year close to 0 introduces an infinite amount of scope insensitivity. Regardless of the number of beings affected, the change in their welfare will be estimated to be exactly 0ā.
Could you elaborate on why you seem to believe the probability of sentience of nematodes is Pascalianly low, and therefore arguably much lower than RPās mainline estimate of 6.8 %? I feel like one can reasonably argue from this that the probability of sentience of silkworms is also Pascalianly low, and therefore not worry about improving the conditions of BSFs and mealworms, which RP estimates will be 417 billion in 2033.
Feel free to follow up later if you are finding this discussion draining, and not productive. I think it would be good for RP to write a post clarifying the extent to which the methodology used to produce RPās mainline welfare ranges apply to the animals covered and not covered, and why.
Thanks for sharing your thoughts, Laura!
Could you clarify why your methodology is supposed to apply to silkworms, but not nematodes? I agree nematodes have a less complex brain and nervous system, but silkworms are also less complex than other animals, so I do not understand how you are deciding when your methodology is supposed to be applicable. Did you preregister the animals to which you thought your methods should apply to?
My understanding is that estimating RPās mainline welfare ranges involved tens of judgement calls similar to the one you made to get the probability of sentience of nematodes. My broader point is that I do not know what majorly distinguishes nematodes from silkworms for you to think only the latter are reasonably covered by your methodology.
I had understood the estimates in the sheet which is no longer public were preliminary. However, it is still the case that the welfare range conditional on sentience under the pleasure-and-pain-centric model is proportional to the sum of the probabilities of the respective proxies being present? If so, for RPās probability of sentience of nematodes of 6.8 %, a single behavioural proxy likely to be absent results in a welfare range of nematodes conditional on the rate of subjective experience of humans of at least 2.31*10^-4 (= 0.068*0.00339), which both me and Nick consider high.
The conversion from qualitative probabilistic descriptions to probabilities adds uncertainty, but I do not think it the driver of disagreement. In my mind, and I guess Nickās, the major issue is that the effect of the presence of behaviours on the welfare range is not moderated by neural complexity. RPās mainline welfare ranges consider āone-ninth weight to the possibility that an organismās welfare range [conditional on sentience, and the rate of subjective experience of humans] is equal to the number of neurons it possesses relative to humansā. So an organism having 0 neurons only decreases its welfare range conditional on sentience, and the rate of subjective experience of humans by 1ā9. I understand having no neurons at all would also lead to a lower probability of sentience, but I think it should directly imply a much larger decrease in the welfare range conditional on sentience.
What is your best guess for the probability of sentience of nematodes? It could be lower than 6.8 %, but still very far from Pascalianly low. I think reasonable approaches to deal with meta-normative uncertainty (about how to aggregate the recommendations of different moral theories) should not dismiss a 6.8 % or slightly lower chance of causing huge amounts of suffering.
In the book, ā10 percent [weight is assined] to the equality modelā, under which the welfare range conditional on sentience is 1. So the final welfare ranges conditional on sentience are at least 0.1 (= 0.1*1). Do you endorse the estimates presented in Table 8.6 of the book over RPās mainline welfare ranges?
Hi Vasco,
When Bob was selecting the species, he was thinking of adult insects as the edge cases for the model (bees, BSF). He included juveniles to see what the model implies, not because he really thought the model should be extended to them. Youāll notice that, in the book, the species list narrows considerably partly for this reason.
On the points related to sentience-conditioned welfare ranges, e.g. āSo an organism having 0 neurons only decreases its welfare range conditional on sentience, and the rate of subjective experience of humans by 1ā9. I understand having no neurons at all would also lead to a lower probability of sentience, but I think it should directly imply a much larger decrease in the welfare range conditional on sentience.ā
I think itās a mistake to point to a hypothetical sentience-conditioned welfare range, which is an intermediate step in the calculations, for an animal that has zero neurons as indicative of an issue with the methodology overall for animals with complex brains.
Put straightforwardly, if an animal has zero neurons, it would have a welfare range of 0 overall, because I would give it a zero percent chance of being sentient, which affects all the models.
I also am not going to put a precise probability of sentience on nematodes, but I do think itās much much closer to zero and crosses the threshold of being Pascalās mugged.
Iām finding these discussions very draining and not productive at this point, so will not be engaging further in this debate.
Thanks, Laura.
I encourage you to disclaim in the post with RPās mainline welfare ranges that Bob does not think the methodology used to produce them is applicable to silkworms. In practice, what does this mean? Would it be reasonable to neglect beings to which your methodology is not supposed to apply? Why is the methodology applicable to black soldier flies (BSFs), but not silkworms? I understand a methodology can be more or less applicable, but I still do not understand which concrete criteria you are using. I also think the applicability of the methodology should ideally be taken into account in the estimates such that these are more comparable.
I suggest people account for the lower applicability of your methodology to less complex organisms by using welfare ranges equal to the geometric mean between RPās mainline welfare ranges, and the number of neurons as a fraction of that of humans. Does this seem reasonable?
I am not certain that neurons are required for an organism to have a non-constant welfare, so I think organisms without neurons have welfare ranges above 0. I guess you mean that organisms without neurons have a welfare range of roughly 0, but exactly how close to 0 matters. As I say in the post, āRounding to 0 a probability of sentience, or welfare per animal-year close to 0 introduces an infinite amount of scope insensitivity. Regardless of the number of beings affected, the change in their welfare will be estimated to be exactly 0ā.
Could you elaborate on why you seem to believe the probability of sentience of nematodes is Pascalianly low, and therefore arguably much lower than RPās mainline estimate of 6.8 %? I feel like one can reasonably argue from this that the probability of sentience of silkworms is also Pascalianly low, and therefore not worry about improving the conditions of BSFs and mealworms, which RP estimates will be 417 billion in 2033.
Feel free to follow up later if you are finding this discussion draining, and not productive. I think it would be good for RP to write a post clarifying the extent to which the methodology used to produce RPās mainline welfare ranges apply to the animals covered and not covered, and why.