Much has been written about why we should not concede to such.
I’ve seen much written that takes it as a premise that you shouldn’t concede to a Pascal’s mugging, but I’ve seen very little about why not.
(I can think of arguments for not conceding in the actual Pascal’s mugging thought experiment: (1) ignoring threats as a game-theoretic strategy and (2) threats of unlikely outcomes constituting evidence against the outcome. Neither of these apply to caring about soil nematodes.)
I’ve seen much written that takes it as a premise that you shouldn’t concede to a Pascal’s mugging, but I’ve seen very little about why not.
You may be right. I think a lot of us feel that it is intuitively wrong and take that as a premise.
I don’t have a rigorous argument against biting the bullet of expected value in the abstract. But in my view, utility calculations will never fully account for 2nd order harms (let alone alternative moral perspectives), and I think that provides ample reason to not rely on numbers alone and err on the side of caution.
Specific risks that come to mind for me here (at least, in the unlikely scenario where the nematode-extinction movement enters the EA mainstream) risks that come to mind for me are reputational damage, intra-movement conflict, climate change exacerbation, biodiversity loss, and the possibility of redirecting evolution toward greater suffering. I’m sure there’s plenty of other risks I haven’t considered.
I’m all for caring about soil nematodes and researching their welfare! I just think we need more clarity to justify shifting unrelated charity spending.
I’ve seen much written that takes it as a premise that you shouldn’t concede to a Pascal’s mugging, but I’ve seen very little about why not.
(I can think of arguments for not conceding in the actual Pascal’s mugging thought experiment: (1) ignoring threats as a game-theoretic strategy and (2) threats of unlikely outcomes constituting evidence against the outcome. Neither of these apply to caring about soil nematodes.)
You may be right. I think a lot of us feel that it is intuitively wrong and take that as a premise.
I don’t have a rigorous argument against biting the bullet of expected value in the abstract. But in my view, utility calculations will never fully account for 2nd order harms (let alone alternative moral perspectives), and I think that provides ample reason to not rely on numbers alone and err on the side of caution.
Specific risks that come to mind for me here (at least, in the unlikely scenario where the nematode-extinction movement enters the EA mainstream) risks that come to mind for me are reputational damage, intra-movement conflict, climate change exacerbation, biodiversity loss, and the possibility of redirecting evolution toward greater suffering. I’m sure there’s plenty of other risks I haven’t considered.
I’m all for caring about soil nematodes and researching their welfare! I just think we need more clarity to justify shifting unrelated charity spending.