Thanks, Stijn. I think it is better to keep the analogies simple. Imagine there is a glass with alcohol, whose freezing point is −114 ºC, at a temperature of 0.2 ºC. Consider a thermometer which systematically underestimates temperature by 1 ºC, another which systematically overestimates temperature by 1 ºC, and another which is well calibrated. In addition, assume the thermometers can only display integers. The thermometers would output temperatures of −1, 1, and 0 ºC. However, despite the different calibration of the thermometers, and their outputted temperature, it is not indeterminate whether the temperature of the alcohol in the glass is below or above 0 ºC. Subjective measurements of the hedonistic welfare of nematodes are much more uncertain than measurements of the temperature of ethanol with thermometers. However, what is the fundamental difference that makes you conclude there is no fact of the matter about whether nematodes have a positive or negative welfare per animal-year? Why does it mean one can neglect the welfare of nematodes, but not of farmed insects?
I still prefer the special relativity analogy, because its mathematical structure is similar to what I have in mind about welfare of nematodes. Your alcohol temperature analogy seems to be misleading, because it speaks about over- and underestimations and being well calibrated, but that is not the issue. The clocks of observers in special relativity are all well-calibrated, no clock overestimates time. And yet there is this weird kind of intransitivity in special relativity, where space-time events X and Y happen simultaneously (at time 0), space-time event Z is in the future of Y, and yet events X and Z also happen simultaneously (at time 0, but according to another reference frame). Same goes for nematode welfare: nematode in state X (non-existence) and Y have the same welfare (equal to 0), the nematode in state Z is strictly happier than in Y, and yet there is a welfare frame according to which states X and Z are equally good (welfare 0).
I believe (farmed) insects have a wider welfare range than nematodes, which means it is less likely that all their positive and negative experiences are incommensurable with non-existence. An insect can be so miserable that its welfare is negative according to all welfare frames, in which case it is objectively/absolutely true that that insect has a negative welfare. A nematode cannot reach such intense levels of misery.
There is only one right perspective to assess the welfare of a being under hedonism. The perspective of the being whose welfare is being assessed. When I say my best guess is that the (hedonistic) welfare per animal-year of soil nematodes is negative, I am effectively guessing that I would prefer not existing over being born as a random soil nematode.
I am missing a quantitative argument distinguishing nematodes from insects. I feel like someone else could just as reasonably argue for neglecting effects on insects because their welfare range is still too small. For reference, “My estimate for the welfare range of soil nematodes of 6.68*10^-6 is 0.334 % of RP’s mainline welfare range of silkworms of 0.002”. Why is 0.002 not small enough? What is the minimum welfare range for effects to be considered? Why?
The crucial issue is that a nematode may not be able to compare its welfare with non-existence. Even for me it may be hard to compare welfare with non-existence, i.e. imagining a level of welfare at which I would be indifferent with non-existence. I believe there is not always a straightforward answer, even under hedonism, when one’s welfare is at a similar level as non-existence. Just as in special relativity there is not always a straightforward answer when a space-time event happens now. Still, in special relativity, time is a continuous variable that can in principle be measured with infinite accuracy (i.e. clocks could in principle be infinitely well-calibrated in the theory of special relativity). So the notion of time makes perfect sense in special relativity, but the notion of “now” does not. Similarly: the notion of welfare makes perfect sense in hedonism, but the notion of zero welfare does not.
Yes, we are missing quantitative estimates for determining zero welfare of nematodes and insects. Like we do not know the speed of light. All I can say is that in the special relativity analogy, a nematode has a “lower speed of light” than an insect. And sure, I consider it likely that even insects have a welfare range that is smaller than the neutral range. This neutral range is the range of welfare levels that are incommensurable with zero, or the range of welfare levels for which there always is a valid welfare frame such that the welfare is zero. If the welfare range is smaller than the neutral range, it is always impossible to objectively/absolutely determine whether a welfare is positive or negative: there is always a valid welfare frame for which the welfare is positive, and another equally valid welfare frame for which the welfare is negative. This is all compatible with hedonism. I guess you assume in your hedonic theory, the speed of light is infinite, which means there is one absolute welfare frame (as in Newtonian physics there is one absolute reference frame). The more I think about it, the more skeptical I am about that assumption of an absolute welfare frame.
Do you think newborns can compare their (hedonistic) welfare to non-existence? I assume they cannot. However, I still think there is a fact of the matter about whether any given newborn has a positive or negative (expected) welfare over a certain period of time. Likewise for nematodes or any other being.
I do not quite understand what you mean by neutral range, but it looks like you would consider effects on nematodes if the neutral range of these was smaller than their welfare range. If so, you can only neglect effects on nematodes if you are certain their neutral range is larger than their welfare range. I assign this a probability of 0, not 1, as I see welfare per animal-year (as assessed by the being experiencing it) as a continuous distribution.
Yes, I think newborns can compare their welfare with non-existence, to a small degree, but I’m uncertain about it. That is why I think it is so difficult to estimate whether my newborn sons have a positive or negative welfare. I tend to believe that my first son had a negative welfare the first few weeks and positive now, and my second son (who is a month old and lying next to me now) has an average positive welfare these days. But it could easily be indeterminate. For a nematode I’m much more confident that it is indeterminate. A question I would ask is: would the most empathic veterinarians prefer to euthanize a nematode, like they prefers to euthanize a dog when that dog has a negative welfare? I doubt it. Would the most empathic total utilitarians prefer to breed more nematodes, like they prefer the existence of more individuals with positive welfare? I doubt it. Would those people believe that a nematode happens to have exactly 0 welfare? I doubt it. So a nematode’s welfare is not clearly negative, not clearly positive, and not clearly zero. Then what is it? It’s incommensurable with 0.
Yes, if a nematode’s neutral range was smaller or zero, I would say that there is an objective fact of the matter whether the nematode has positive or negative welfare. just like when speed of light is infinite, there is an absolute reference frame, and every space-time event is either in the future, the present or the past of this space time-event I call “now!” That’s Newtonian physics.
Your case would be like assigning a probability of 0 to the possibility that the speed of light is finite. Note that the fact that welfare is continuous, is irrelevant: also time in special relativity is continuous.
Thanks, Stijn. I think it is better to keep the analogies simple. Imagine there is a glass with alcohol, whose freezing point is −114 ºC, at a temperature of 0.2 ºC. Consider a thermometer which systematically underestimates temperature by 1 ºC, another which systematically overestimates temperature by 1 ºC, and another which is well calibrated. In addition, assume the thermometers can only display integers. The thermometers would output temperatures of −1, 1, and 0 ºC. However, despite the different calibration of the thermometers, and their outputted temperature, it is not indeterminate whether the temperature of the alcohol in the glass is below or above 0 ºC. Subjective measurements of the hedonistic welfare of nematodes are much more uncertain than measurements of the temperature of ethanol with thermometers. However, what is the fundamental difference that makes you conclude there is no fact of the matter about whether nematodes have a positive or negative welfare per animal-year? Why does it mean one can neglect the welfare of nematodes, but not of farmed insects?
I still prefer the special relativity analogy, because its mathematical structure is similar to what I have in mind about welfare of nematodes. Your alcohol temperature analogy seems to be misleading, because it speaks about over- and underestimations and being well calibrated, but that is not the issue. The clocks of observers in special relativity are all well-calibrated, no clock overestimates time. And yet there is this weird kind of intransitivity in special relativity, where space-time events X and Y happen simultaneously (at time 0), space-time event Z is in the future of Y, and yet events X and Z also happen simultaneously (at time 0, but according to another reference frame). Same goes for nematode welfare: nematode in state X (non-existence) and Y have the same welfare (equal to 0), the nematode in state Z is strictly happier than in Y, and yet there is a welfare frame according to which states X and Z are equally good (welfare 0).
I believe (farmed) insects have a wider welfare range than nematodes, which means it is less likely that all their positive and negative experiences are incommensurable with non-existence. An insect can be so miserable that its welfare is negative according to all welfare frames, in which case it is objectively/absolutely true that that insect has a negative welfare. A nematode cannot reach such intense levels of misery.
Thanks, Stijn.
There is only one right perspective to assess the welfare of a being under hedonism. The perspective of the being whose welfare is being assessed. When I say my best guess is that the (hedonistic) welfare per animal-year of soil nematodes is negative, I am effectively guessing that I would prefer not existing over being born as a random soil nematode.
I am missing a quantitative argument distinguishing nematodes from insects. I feel like someone else could just as reasonably argue for neglecting effects on insects because their welfare range is still too small. For reference, “My estimate for the welfare range of soil nematodes of 6.68*10^-6 is 0.334 % of RP’s mainline welfare range of silkworms of 0.002”. Why is 0.002 not small enough? What is the minimum welfare range for effects to be considered? Why?
The crucial issue is that a nematode may not be able to compare its welfare with non-existence. Even for me it may be hard to compare welfare with non-existence, i.e. imagining a level of welfare at which I would be indifferent with non-existence. I believe there is not always a straightforward answer, even under hedonism, when one’s welfare is at a similar level as non-existence. Just as in special relativity there is not always a straightforward answer when a space-time event happens now. Still, in special relativity, time is a continuous variable that can in principle be measured with infinite accuracy (i.e. clocks could in principle be infinitely well-calibrated in the theory of special relativity). So the notion of time makes perfect sense in special relativity, but the notion of “now” does not. Similarly: the notion of welfare makes perfect sense in hedonism, but the notion of zero welfare does not.
Yes, we are missing quantitative estimates for determining zero welfare of nematodes and insects. Like we do not know the speed of light. All I can say is that in the special relativity analogy, a nematode has a “lower speed of light” than an insect. And sure, I consider it likely that even insects have a welfare range that is smaller than the neutral range. This neutral range is the range of welfare levels that are incommensurable with zero, or the range of welfare levels for which there always is a valid welfare frame such that the welfare is zero. If the welfare range is smaller than the neutral range, it is always impossible to objectively/absolutely determine whether a welfare is positive or negative: there is always a valid welfare frame for which the welfare is positive, and another equally valid welfare frame for which the welfare is negative. This is all compatible with hedonism. I guess you assume in your hedonic theory, the speed of light is infinite, which means there is one absolute welfare frame (as in Newtonian physics there is one absolute reference frame). The more I think about it, the more skeptical I am about that assumption of an absolute welfare frame.
Do you think newborns can compare their (hedonistic) welfare to non-existence? I assume they cannot. However, I still think there is a fact of the matter about whether any given newborn has a positive or negative (expected) welfare over a certain period of time. Likewise for nematodes or any other being.
I do not quite understand what you mean by neutral range, but it looks like you would consider effects on nematodes if the neutral range of these was smaller than their welfare range. If so, you can only neglect effects on nematodes if you are certain their neutral range is larger than their welfare range. I assign this a probability of 0, not 1, as I see welfare per animal-year (as assessed by the being experiencing it) as a continuous distribution.
Yes, I think newborns can compare their welfare with non-existence, to a small degree, but I’m uncertain about it. That is why I think it is so difficult to estimate whether my newborn sons have a positive or negative welfare. I tend to believe that my first son had a negative welfare the first few weeks and positive now, and my second son (who is a month old and lying next to me now) has an average positive welfare these days. But it could easily be indeterminate. For a nematode I’m much more confident that it is indeterminate. A question I would ask is: would the most empathic veterinarians prefer to euthanize a nematode, like they prefers to euthanize a dog when that dog has a negative welfare? I doubt it. Would the most empathic total utilitarians prefer to breed more nematodes, like they prefer the existence of more individuals with positive welfare? I doubt it. Would those people believe that a nematode happens to have exactly 0 welfare? I doubt it. So a nematode’s welfare is not clearly negative, not clearly positive, and not clearly zero. Then what is it? It’s incommensurable with 0.
I wrote some ideas about that neutral range here:
https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2021/10/16/person-affecting-neutral-range-utilitarianism/
https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2020/08/26/relativistic-welfare-farm-animal-abolitionism-and-wild-animal-welfarism/
Yes, if a nematode’s neutral range was smaller or zero, I would say that there is an objective fact of the matter whether the nematode has positive or negative welfare. just like when speed of light is infinite, there is an absolute reference frame, and every space-time event is either in the future, the present or the past of this space time-event I call “now!” That’s Newtonian physics.
Your case would be like assigning a probability of 0 to the possibility that the speed of light is finite. Note that the fact that welfare is continuous, is irrelevant: also time in special relativity is continuous.
Thanks for the discussion, and best wishes for your newborn son, Stijn!
yes, this was a fruitful discussion; thanks! I summarized my arguments here: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/udcCBBwGnCneLRjkH/should-we-consider-the-welfare-of-small-soil-animals-on-the