I will first focus on this paragraph that you wrote:
In the takeaways, however, you don’t focus on what should be the biggest (drawing from your argument as only basis) from an EA perspective: that we should be in favor of actions that increase the numbers of lives. Then, it’s probably good to promote veganism as this seems to increase the farming of small animals on the margin. And to promote actions that reduce the amount of agricultural land, so that more wild animals can live there. Both of these actions seem fairly morally acceptable (especially if one realizes that wild animals have been there long before us, and that we may have some duties of preservation), compared to more “maximizing” takes on maximizing the amount of individual lives on earth. Doing this seems massively more important (on a numbers-scale), if one thinks life has positive value, than counteracting the small effects of lives not being lived caused by a few plant-based advocacy organizations (let alone wild animal advocacy, which doesn’t seem to have affected the world much for now).
And I can only respond in somewhat illogical manner. Because, if we follow logic, then you’re probably right.
So the first thing: my life-affirming stance isn’t necessarily a life-maximizing stance. Especially if this involves deliberately shifting our consumption patterns in such a way that we farm as many animals as possible or deliberately increase the extent of wildlife habitats.
If I were to support veganism, it would not be because it increases the farming of small animals on margin (indirect effect), but because I believe that reducing meat consumption lowers demand for farming animals, lowering their numbers, thus allowing us to keep those who remain in better, more humane conditions (direct effect). So when I’m thinking about deciding whether to eat chicken, I think primarily about chicken welfare. If I decided to donate to a charity that deals with welfare of certain animals, I primarily think about those very animals that the charity deals with.
Second, and very important thing: I really don’t know how far is too far when it comes to taking into consideration indirect effects. I’m afraid that taking indirect effects too much into consideration could lead to some situations that are very difficult to resolve. It can lead to strong cluelessness, the situation in which we’re never sure if we’re doing good at all, or if it is in fact counterproductive. Imagine this process:
First we do action A to help species B, and we’re convinced doing A is very good.
Then we realize that helping B indirectly hurts species C to a much greater extent, so doing A is very bad, and we stop.
Then we realize that hurting C, is in fact great, because it indirectly helps species D to even greater extent, so doing A, once again becomes very good.
Then we go back to doing A, but not to help B, but to help D.
We might on some level love B, empathize with them, identify with them somewhat, and when we were doing A to help B, this felt like a genuine care—our actions and our emotions were in harmony.
But D? - we don’t really care much about D. Our theory tells us that Ds are very numerous and that helping them might outweigh all our other moral concerns due to their sheer number, even if they aren’t conscious at all. But there is still some probability they might be, and due to their sheer number we can’t afford to dismiss it.
So now we’re doing A, not to help B (direct beneficiaries) whom we love , but to help D (indirect beneficiaries) about whom we don’t really care, and this feels emotionally very alienating and weird.
We’re just waiting until we learn that helping Ds is in fact terrible, because it harms Es, which are even more numerous, etc...
Since this process can be quite long, at each step of this process we can be quite unsure of whether what we’re doing is good at all, and this lack of conviction can make our motivation to help and donate grow much weaker. We can start thinking “If I’m unsure if it helps or hurts (in sense of increasing or decreasing aggregate welfare), maybe I shouldn’t do anything at all, and instead mind my own business”.
So I’m wondering can we really afford to completely divorce our actions (donations, etc...) from our love, care and emotions? Or alternatively, can we afford to maintain even a modicum of love and genuine care while we’re doing good?
I mean if we remove love and use just reasoning, maybe then indeed, the only logical project that we should pursue is eventually turning the Universe into hedonium.
But if we involve love and emotions, then perhaps it makes sense to help chicken because we care about chicken, to help people because we care about people, to help shrimps, because we care about shrimps, etc… In short to do focus our considerations on direct beneficiaries and thus retain this harmony between emotions and actions.
I think this is the way most people became altruists and effective altruists in the first place.
They donated money for malaria nets, in order to help those who receive nets. They donated to chicken charities in order to help chicken, etc… Imagining children dying of malaria or chicken living in terrible conditions was a strong motivating factor to step in and do something about it.
But nowadays, all I see is discussions about 2nd, 3rd, 4th order indirect effects of our actions.
But, logic is on your side, not on mine. Maybe I’m too lazy. Maybe I don’t want to make effort to consider those distant indirect effects. Maybe I don’t want to follow the logic to its conclusion. Maybe. I don’t know.
I probably lack certain virtues needed for such detached thinking.
But maybe such detached thinking too lacks something important that is fails to identify.
I don’t want to butt into your conversation with JoA, but I just want to say that there are good, logical reasons to support your intuitions, e.g., that long chains of indirect causation are far more dubious and should be taken into account much less than the direct effects of actions. You should be more confident in your ability to think logically! Sometimes it takes time to turn intuitions into clear, logical arguments, and in that case what we need is patience with intuitions, not to deny them their voice.
Thanks for your reply and feedback.
I will first focus on this paragraph that you wrote:
And I can only respond in somewhat illogical manner. Because, if we follow logic, then you’re probably right.
So the first thing: my life-affirming stance isn’t necessarily a life-maximizing stance. Especially if this involves deliberately shifting our consumption patterns in such a way that we farm as many animals as possible or deliberately increase the extent of wildlife habitats.
If I were to support veganism, it would not be because it increases the farming of small animals on margin (indirect effect), but because I believe that reducing meat consumption lowers demand for farming animals, lowering their numbers, thus allowing us to keep those who remain in better, more humane conditions (direct effect). So when I’m thinking about deciding whether to eat chicken, I think primarily about chicken welfare. If I decided to donate to a charity that deals with welfare of certain animals, I primarily think about those very animals that the charity deals with.
Second, and very important thing: I really don’t know how far is too far when it comes to taking into consideration indirect effects. I’m afraid that taking indirect effects too much into consideration could lead to some situations that are very difficult to resolve. It can lead to strong cluelessness, the situation in which we’re never sure if we’re doing good at all, or if it is in fact counterproductive. Imagine this process:
First we do action A to help species B, and we’re convinced doing A is very good.
Then we realize that helping B indirectly hurts species C to a much greater extent, so doing A is very bad, and we stop.
Then we realize that hurting C, is in fact great, because it indirectly helps species D to even greater extent, so doing A, once again becomes very good.
Then we go back to doing A, but not to help B, but to help D.
We might on some level love B, empathize with them, identify with them somewhat, and when we were doing A to help B, this felt like a genuine care—our actions and our emotions were in harmony.
But D? - we don’t really care much about D. Our theory tells us that Ds are very numerous and that helping them might outweigh all our other moral concerns due to their sheer number, even if they aren’t conscious at all. But there is still some probability they might be, and due to their sheer number we can’t afford to dismiss it.
So now we’re doing A, not to help B (direct beneficiaries) whom we love , but to help D (indirect beneficiaries) about whom we don’t really care, and this feels emotionally very alienating and weird.
We’re just waiting until we learn that helping Ds is in fact terrible, because it harms Es, which are even more numerous, etc...
Since this process can be quite long, at each step of this process we can be quite unsure of whether what we’re doing is good at all, and this lack of conviction can make our motivation to help and donate grow much weaker. We can start thinking “If I’m unsure if it helps or hurts (in sense of increasing or decreasing aggregate welfare), maybe I shouldn’t do anything at all, and instead mind my own business”.
So I’m wondering can we really afford to completely divorce our actions (donations, etc...) from our love, care and emotions? Or alternatively, can we afford to maintain even a modicum of love and genuine care while we’re doing good?
I mean if we remove love and use just reasoning, maybe then indeed, the only logical project that we should pursue is eventually turning the Universe into hedonium.
But if we involve love and emotions, then perhaps it makes sense to help chicken because we care about chicken, to help people because we care about people, to help shrimps, because we care about shrimps, etc… In short to do focus our considerations on direct beneficiaries and thus retain this harmony between emotions and actions.
I think this is the way most people became altruists and effective altruists in the first place.
They donated money for malaria nets, in order to help those who receive nets. They donated to chicken charities in order to help chicken, etc… Imagining children dying of malaria or chicken living in terrible conditions was a strong motivating factor to step in and do something about it.
But nowadays, all I see is discussions about 2nd, 3rd, 4th order indirect effects of our actions.
But, logic is on your side, not on mine. Maybe I’m too lazy. Maybe I don’t want to make effort to consider those distant indirect effects. Maybe I don’t want to follow the logic to its conclusion. Maybe. I don’t know.
I probably lack certain virtues needed for such detached thinking.
But maybe such detached thinking too lacks something important that is fails to identify.
I really don’t know.
I don’t want to butt into your conversation with JoA, but I just want to say that there are good, logical reasons to support your intuitions, e.g., that long chains of indirect causation are far more dubious and should be taken into account much less than the direct effects of actions. You should be more confident in your ability to think logically! Sometimes it takes time to turn intuitions into clear, logical arguments, and in that case what we need is patience with intuitions, not to deny them their voice.