I think the word âconsentâ might have been a somewhat poor choice, since it has more connotations than we need. Rather, the concept is closer to âbearabilityâ or just the fact that an individualâs personal preferences seem to involve lexicality, which the two articles I linked to get into. For suffering, itâs when someone wants to make it stop, at any cost (or any cost in certain kinds of experiences, say, e.g. any number of sufficiently mild pains, or any amount of pleasure).
There are objections to this, too, of course:
1. We have unreliable intuitions/âpreferences involving large numbers (e.g. a large number of pin pricks vs torture).
2. We may be trying to generalize from imagining ourselves in situations like sufficiently intense suffering in which we canât possibly be reflective or rational, so any intuitions coming out of this would be unreliable. Lexicality might happen only (perhaps by definition) when we canât possibly be reflective or rational. Furthermore, if this is the case, then this is a reason against the conjunction of trusting our own lexicality directly and not directly trusting the lexicality of nonhuman animals, including simpler ones like insects.
3. We mostly have unreliable intuitions about the kinds of intense suffering people have lexical preferences about, since few of us actually experience it.
That being said, I think each of these objections cuts both ways: they only tell us our intuitions are unreliable in these cases, they donât tell us whether lexicality should be accepted or rejected. I can think of arguments for each:
1. We should trust personal preferences (at least when informed by personal experience), even when theyâre unreliable, unless they are actually inconsistent with intuitions we think are more important and less unreliable, which isnât the case for me, but might be for others.
2. We should reject unreliable personal preferences that cost us uniformity in our theory. (The personal preferences are unreliable either way, but accommodating lexical ones make our theory less uniform, assuming we want to accept aggregating in certain ways in our theory in the first place, which itself might be contentious.)
I would be happy to discuss over a call, but it might actually be more productive to talk to Magnus Vinding if you can, since heâs read and thought much more about this.
I think the word âconsentâ might have been a somewhat poor choice, since it has more connotations than we need. Rather, the concept is closer to âbearabilityâ or just the fact that an individualâs personal preferences seem to involve lexicality, which the two articles I linked to get into. For suffering, itâs when someone wants to make it stop, at any cost (or any cost in certain kinds of experiences, say, e.g. any number of sufficiently mild pains, or any amount of pleasure).
There are objections to this, too, of course:
1. We have unreliable intuitions/âpreferences involving large numbers (e.g. a large number of pin pricks vs torture).
2. We may be trying to generalize from imagining ourselves in situations like sufficiently intense suffering in which we canât possibly be reflective or rational, so any intuitions coming out of this would be unreliable. Lexicality might happen only (perhaps by definition) when we canât possibly be reflective or rational. Furthermore, if this is the case, then this is a reason against the conjunction of trusting our own lexicality directly and not directly trusting the lexicality of nonhuman animals, including simpler ones like insects.
3. We mostly have unreliable intuitions about the kinds of intense suffering people have lexical preferences about, since few of us actually experience it.
That being said, I think each of these objections cuts both ways: they only tell us our intuitions are unreliable in these cases, they donât tell us whether lexicality should be accepted or rejected. I can think of arguments for each:
1. We should trust personal preferences (at least when informed by personal experience), even when theyâre unreliable, unless they are actually inconsistent with intuitions we think are more important and less unreliable, which isnât the case for me, but might be for others.
2. We should reject unreliable personal preferences that cost us uniformity in our theory. (The personal preferences are unreliable either way, but accommodating lexical ones make our theory less uniform, assuming we want to accept aggregating in certain ways in our theory in the first place, which itself might be contentious.)
I would be happy to discuss over a call, but it might actually be more productive to talk to Magnus Vinding if you can, since heâs read and thought much more about this.