I don’t think our primary problem was with flawed probability assignments over some set of explicitly considered hypotheses. If I were to continue with the probabilistic metaphor, I’d be much more tempted to say that we erred in our formation of the practical hypothesis space — that is, the finite set of hypothesis that the EA community considered to be salient, and worthy of extended discussion.
Afaik (and at least in my personal experience), very few EAs seemed to think the potential malfeasance of FTX was an important topic to discuss. Because the topics weren’t salient, few people bothered to assign explicit probabilities. To me, the fact that we weren’t focusing on the right topics, in some nebulous sense, is more concerning than the ways in which we erred in assigning probabilities to claims within our practical hypothesis space.
Upvoted, but I disagree with this framing.
I don’t think our primary problem was with flawed probability assignments over some set of explicitly considered hypotheses. If I were to continue with the probabilistic metaphor, I’d be much more tempted to say that we erred in our formation of the practical hypothesis space — that is, the finite set of hypothesis that the EA community considered to be salient, and worthy of extended discussion.
Afaik (and at least in my personal experience), very few EAs seemed to think the potential malfeasance of FTX was an important topic to discuss. Because the topics weren’t salient, few people bothered to assign explicit probabilities. To me, the fact that we weren’t focusing on the right topics, in some nebulous sense, is more concerning than the ways in which we erred in assigning probabilities to claims within our practical hypothesis space.