Would you say that what dictates my view on (a)vs(b) is my uncertainty between different epistemic principles
It seems pretty implausible to me that there are distinct normative principles that, combined with the principle of non-arbitrariness I mention in the āProblem 1ā section, imply (b). Instead I suspect Vasco is reasoning about the implications of epistemic principles (applied to our evidence) in a way Iād find uncompelling even if I endorsed precise Bayesianism. So I think Iād answer ānoā to your question. But I donāt understand Vascoās view well enough to be confident.
Can you explain more why answering ānoā makes metanormatively bracketing in consequentialist bracketing (a bit) arbitrary? My thinking is: Let E be epistemic principles that, among other things, require non-arbitrariness. (So, normative views that involve E might provide strong reasons for choice, all else equal.) If itās sufficiently implausible that E would imply Vascoās view, then E will still leave us clueless, because of insensitivity to mild sweetening.
I suspect Vasco is reasoning about the implications of epistemic principles (applied to our evidence) in a way Iād find uncompelling even if I endorsed precise Bayesianism.
Oh so for the sake of argument, assume the implications he sees are compelling. You are unsure about whether your good epistemic principles E imply (a) or (b).[1]
So then, the difference between (a) and (b) is purely empirical, and MNB does not allow me to compare (a) and (b), right? This is what Iād find a bit arbitrary, at first glance. The isolated fact that the difference between (a) and (b) is technically empirical and not normative doesnāt feel like a good reason to say that your ābracket in consequentialist bracketingā move is ok but not the ābracket in ex post neartermismā move (with my generous assumptions in favor of ex post neartermism).
I donāt mean to argue that this is a reasonable assumption. Itās just a useful one for me to understand what moves MNB does and does not allow. If you find this assumption hard to make, imagine that you learn that we likely are in simulation that is gonna shut down in 100 years and that the simulators arenāt watching us (so we donāt impact them).
So then, the difference between (a) and (b) is purely empirical, and MNB does not allow me to compare (a) and (b), right? This is what Iād find a bit arbitrary, at first glance.
Gotcha, thanks! Yeah, I think itās fair to be somewhat suspicious of giving special status to ānormative viewsā. Iām still sympathetic to doing so for the reasons I mention in the post (here). But it would be great to dig into this more.
Antonia found an intervention that reduces overall animal suffering in the near-term, but sheās not sure which is true between
L) the long-term effects dominate, but I donāt know what they overall imply, and I canāt ignore them (so Iām clueless).
N) neartermism thanks to bracketing out the long-term effects (so I should intervene).
Brian comes along and says he agrees with the above and subdivides L, this way:
L) the long-term effects dominate, but he doesnāt know what they overall imply, and he canāt ignore them (so heās clueless).
L1) same, but he trusts his longtermist best guess that the intervention is bad, assuming pure negative utilitarianism (so he should not intervene).
L2) same but assuming negative-leaning utilitarianism (so he should not intervene).
L3) he trusts his longtermist best guess that the intervention is good, assuming classical utilitarianism (so he should intervene).
N) neartermism thanks to bracketing out the long-term effects (so he should intervene).
Antonia shares Brianās above best guesses and normative uncertainty. They both totally agree. The only difference is that Brian specified normative sub-views.
Now, say Nuutti joins the party, agrees with these two, but recategorizes things this way:
L1) stubborn precise EV despite imprecision arguments + negative utilitarianism (we should not intervene)
O) all other plausible normative views (in sum, weāre clueless)
The MNB sceptic would say that Antonia grouping L1-3 together to form L is just as arbitrary as Nuutti grouping L2, L3, and N together to form O.[1]
Is your response: The former seems less arbitrary because
L1-3 share key epistemic principles and/āor decision theory that make L an actual normative view (even though the moral theory part is imprecise). In contrast, L2, L3, and N have nothing in common, normatively that justifies grouping them against L1. Itād be too arbitrary to consider N + L2 + L3 as a normative view.
Normative views seem to be the most legitimate units to bracket over (e.g., more legit than empirical views). Making a comprehensive case for/āagainst this would be nice, but I give some reasons for, in this section.
It seems pretty implausible to me that there are distinct normative principles that, combined with the principle of non-arbitrariness I mention in the āProblem 1ā section, imply (b). Instead I suspect Vasco is reasoning about the implications of epistemic principles (applied to our evidence) in a way Iād find uncompelling even if I endorsed precise Bayesianism. So I think Iād answer ānoā to your question. But I donāt understand Vascoās view well enough to be confident.
Can you explain more why answering ānoā makes metanormatively bracketing in consequentialist bracketing (a bit) arbitrary? My thinking is: Let E be epistemic principles that, among other things, require non-arbitrariness. (So, normative views that involve E might provide strong reasons for choice, all else equal.) If itās sufficiently implausible that E would imply Vascoās view, then E will still leave us clueless, because of insensitivity to mild sweetening.
Oh so for the sake of argument, assume the implications he sees are compelling. You are unsure about whether your good epistemic principles E imply (a) or (b).[1]
So then, the difference between (a) and (b) is purely empirical, and MNB does not allow me to compare (a) and (b), right? This is what Iād find a bit arbitrary, at first glance. The isolated fact that the difference between (a) and (b) is technically empirical and not normative doesnāt feel like a good reason to say that your ābracket in consequentialist bracketingā move is ok but not the ābracket in ex post neartermismā move (with my generous assumptions in favor of ex post neartermism).
I donāt mean to argue that this is a reasonable assumption. Itās just a useful one for me to understand what moves MNB does and does not allow. If you find this assumption hard to make, imagine that you learn that we likely are in simulation that is gonna shut down in 100 years and that the simulators arenāt watching us (so we donāt impact them).
Gotcha, thanks! Yeah, I think itās fair to be somewhat suspicious of giving special status to ānormative viewsā. Iām still sympathetic to doing so for the reasons I mention in the post (here). But it would be great to dig into this more.
(Tangential but I guess from the above that you think the following is not another example where MNB is sensitive to the individuation of normative views, and Iād like to understand why. Nw at all if you donāt have the time to reply, tho.)
Antonia found an intervention that reduces overall animal suffering in the near-term, but sheās not sure which is true between
L) the long-term effects dominate, but I donāt know what they overall imply, and I canāt ignore them (so Iām clueless).
N) neartermism thanks to bracketing out the long-term effects (so I should intervene).
Brian comes along and says he agrees with the above and subdivides L, this way:
L) the long-term effects dominate, but he doesnāt know what they overall imply, and he canāt ignore them (so heās clueless).
L1) same, but he trusts his longtermist best guess that the intervention is bad, assuming pure negative utilitarianism (so he should not intervene).
L2) same but assuming negative-leaning utilitarianism (so he should not intervene).
L3) he trusts his longtermist best guess that the intervention is good, assuming classical utilitarianism (so he should intervene).
N) neartermism thanks to bracketing out the long-term effects (so he should intervene).
Antonia shares Brianās above best guesses and normative uncertainty. They both totally agree. The only difference is that Brian specified normative sub-views.
Now, say Nuutti joins the party, agrees with these two, but recategorizes things this way:
L1) stubborn precise EV despite imprecision arguments + negative utilitarianism (we should not intervene)
O) all other plausible normative views (in sum, weāre clueless)
The MNB sceptic would say that Antonia grouping L1-3 together to form L is just as arbitrary as Nuutti grouping L2, L3, and N together to form O.[1]
Is your response: The former seems less arbitrary because
L1-3 share key epistemic principles and/āor decision theory that make L an actual normative view (even though the moral theory part is imprecise). In contrast, L2, L3, and N have nothing in common, normatively that justifies grouping them against L1. Itād be too arbitrary to consider N + L2 + L3 as a normative view.
Normative views seem to be the most legitimate units to bracket over (e.g., more legit than empirical views). Making a comprehensive case for/āagainst this would be nice, but I give some reasons for, in this section.
With the consequentist-bracketing version of the individuation problem I present here, the bracketer can appeal to a āonly value locations that have been identified can be bracketed inā principle. This saves them if this principle is sound. Here, this doesnāt save them. The normative theories have been identified in both cases.