Thanks for the question! Earlier, Vasco gave a consequentialist response, but Iāll try to give a broader response which might chime for more ethical views.
For you, where does the goodness of a lifesaving charity come from? Saving someoneās life:
Enables them to realize the experience of the rest of their life.
Satisfies their desire to survive and not die.
Alleviates the suffering that would have accompanied their death.
These might all seem like noncontroversial benefits, but how one weights between them can have massive implications for cause prioritization. Many EAs consider point (1) to be the main benefit of saving oneās life. Whether or not youāre a consequentialist, if you had to choose between saving a 10-year-old and a 90-year-old, it seems sensible to choose the 10-year-old, because they have so much more life to experience.
But if point (1) is the main benefit of saving a life, even if points (2) and (3) are sizeable parts of the benefit, adding a person to the human population seems close to as good as saving a life! Youāre enabling another person to live an entire lifeās experience.
However, this bumps against the intuition of the goodness of family planning charities. Preventing an unplanned pregnancy absolutely helps a mother, but itās probably not close to as good as saving her life. (Just ask her if sheād rather die or have an unplanned pregnancy. Most would choose the latter.) But we just argued that the effect of preventing another person from living an entire lifeās experience is close to as bad as preventing a life from being saved.
You can also make this argument in the opposite direction: If family planning charities are good, then this must mean itās okay to prevent a person from living a lifeās experience, or itās at least not as bad as the goodness of supporting their motherās autonomy. This would mean lifesaving charities are much less beneficial than we thought they were.
Thank you for this thorough explanation of your views. I am quite curious as to whether you have ever been pregnant. Of course, many people who have been pregnant are vehemently anti-abortion, but my own personal experience of (wanted) pregnancy made me convinced that forcing someone to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term is a crime against their humanity.[1] If you canāt understand why this might be, I would suggest reading Judith Jarvis Thompsonās violinist paper.
I donāt want to relitigate whether abortion ought to be legal (or encouraged, or funded, or whatever), as I find the fact that my bodily autonomy is up for debate to be somewhat dispiriting, so I am going to bow out of this conversation now, but once again I appreciate your taking the time to explain your viewpoint.
ābut what of the fetusās humanity?ā idk man, the fetus is a possible human and the mother is an actual human, and I think actual humans are more important than possible ones. This is also why Iām not a longtermist.
Youāre very welcome! I appreciate you reading and engaging :)
Iām a male and have not been pregnant. Iām familiar with Thompsonās arguments, and I donāt consider them decisive. Depending upon the weeks from gestation, the fetus may be a possible person, but they may also be an actual person.[1] Either way, as in longtermism, I donāt endorse a moral distinction between possible and actual people.
I respect your decision to bow out, so I wonāt elaborate on these points unless you request me to. Thanks again for your engagement!
āOverall, the evidence, and a balanced reading of that evidence, points towards an immediate and unreflective pain experience mediated by the developing function of the nervous system from as early as 12 weeks.ā Derbyshire, S. W., & Bockmann, J. C. (2020). Reconsidering fetal pain. Journal of Medical Ethics, 46(1), 3ā6. https://āādoi.org/āā10.1136/āāmedethics-2019-105701
Thanks for the question! Earlier, Vasco gave a consequentialist response, but Iāll try to give a broader response which might chime for more ethical views.
For you, where does the goodness of a lifesaving charity come from? Saving someoneās life:
Enables them to realize the experience of the rest of their life.
Satisfies their desire to survive and not die.
Alleviates the suffering that would have accompanied their death.
These might all seem like noncontroversial benefits, but how one weights between them can have massive implications for cause prioritization. Many EAs consider point (1) to be the main benefit of saving oneās life. Whether or not youāre a consequentialist, if you had to choose between saving a 10-year-old and a 90-year-old, it seems sensible to choose the 10-year-old, because they have so much more life to experience.
But if point (1) is the main benefit of saving a life, even if points (2) and (3) are sizeable parts of the benefit, adding a person to the human population seems close to as good as saving a life! Youāre enabling another person to live an entire lifeās experience.
However, this bumps against the intuition of the goodness of family planning charities. Preventing an unplanned pregnancy absolutely helps a mother, but itās probably not close to as good as saving her life. (Just ask her if sheād rather die or have an unplanned pregnancy. Most would choose the latter.) But we just argued that the effect of preventing another person from living an entire lifeās experience is close to as bad as preventing a life from being saved.
You can also make this argument in the opposite direction: If family planning charities are good, then this must mean itās okay to prevent a person from living a lifeās experience, or itās at least not as bad as the goodness of supporting their motherās autonomy. This would mean lifesaving charities are much less beneficial than we thought they were.
(Full disclosure: I take the first perspective, and donāt support family planning charities.)
Thank you for this thorough explanation of your views. I am quite curious as to whether you have ever been pregnant. Of course, many people who have been pregnant are vehemently anti-abortion, but my own personal experience of (wanted) pregnancy made me convinced that forcing someone to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term is a crime against their humanity.[1] If you canāt understand why this might be, I would suggest reading Judith Jarvis Thompsonās violinist paper.
I donāt want to relitigate whether abortion ought to be legal (or encouraged, or funded, or whatever), as I find the fact that my bodily autonomy is up for debate to be somewhat dispiriting, so I am going to bow out of this conversation now, but once again I appreciate your taking the time to explain your viewpoint.
ābut what of the fetusās humanity?ā idk man, the fetus is a possible human and the mother is an actual human, and I think actual humans are more important than possible ones. This is also why Iām not a longtermist.
Youāre very welcome! I appreciate you reading and engaging :)
Iām a male and have not been pregnant. Iām familiar with Thompsonās arguments, and I donāt consider them decisive. Depending upon the weeks from gestation, the fetus may be a possible person, but they may also be an actual person.[1] Either way, as in longtermism, I donāt endorse a moral distinction between possible and actual people.
I respect your decision to bow out, so I wonāt elaborate on these points unless you request me to. Thanks again for your engagement!
āOverall, the evidence, and a balanced reading of that evidence, points towards an immediate and unreflective pain experience mediated by the developing function of the nervous system from as early as 12 weeks.ā Derbyshire, S. W., & Bockmann, J. C. (2020). Reconsidering fetal pain. Journal of Medical Ethics, 46(1), 3ā6. https://āādoi.org/āā10.1136/āāmedethics-2019-105701