What do you mean by it’s not an appropriate reference class? If you are saying that being on the edge of the reference class means that the median/mean probability of the reference class is less applicable then I would agree with you.
That is also why I deliberately used the word “suggest” because I am not claiming that the U.S. has a 4% annual risk, but I think it’s plausible and it’s a point for concern.
I am working on an extended version that should go up next week (because OP had the 5k world limit for these submissions). I hope to do a more thorough job with the significance (or lack thereof) of Walter’s book.
Note: I am not heavily persuaded by Walter’s empirical case at the moment (as I mentioned in a footnote). I think the mechanistic picture of the situation is the more compelling case for why the U.S. is at risk of civil conflict.
I don’t think the Metaculus prediction is right. I am hoping that me pushing this argument will get people to update their priors and that this will be reflected in a recalibration of the Metaculus score. At this moment, my belief is that 15% chance of destabilization (or eclipsing the point of no return on the way to destabilization) in the next 10 years is the lower bound of what is reasonable. (this is something I have included in the extended version).
What do you mean by it’s not an appropriate reference class? If you are saying that being on the edge of the reference class means that the median/mean probability of the reference class is less applicable then I would agree with you.
That is also why I deliberately used the word “suggest” because I am not claiming that the U.S. has a 4% annual risk, but I think it’s plausible and it’s a point for concern.
I am working on an extended version that should go up next week (because OP had the 5k world limit for these submissions). I hope to do a more thorough job with the significance (or lack thereof) of Walter’s book.
Note: I am not heavily persuaded by Walter’s empirical case at the moment (as I mentioned in a footnote). I think the mechanistic picture of the situation is the more compelling case for why the U.S. is at risk of civil conflict.
I don’t think the Metaculus prediction is right. I am hoping that me pushing this argument will get people to update their priors and that this will be reflected in a recalibration of the Metaculus score. At this moment, my belief is that 15% chance of destabilization (or eclipsing the point of no return on the way to destabilization) in the next 10 years is the lower bound of what is reasonable. (this is something I have included in the extended version).