Where he talks about how a the case for an individual being longtermist rests on a tiny probability of shifting the entire future.
I think the response to this might be that if we aggregate together the longtermist community, then collectively it’s no longer pascalian. But this feels a bit arbitrary.
Anyway, partly wanted to post this paper here for further reading, and partly an interested in responses.
I agree the basic version of this objection doesn’t work, but my understanding is there’s a more sophisticated version here:
https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/christian-tarsney-the-epistemic-challenge-to-longtermism/
Where he talks about how a the case for an individual being longtermist rests on a tiny probability of shifting the entire future.
I think the response to this might be that if we aggregate together the longtermist community, then collectively it’s no longer pascalian. But this feels a bit arbitrary.
Anyway, partly wanted to post this paper here for further reading, and partly an interested in responses.