Hey, this is a great topic and it’s really awesome that you’re writing a brief for such an influential audience. I haven’t seen and wouldn’t expect to see much EA-specific discussion of foreign policy, but I think this is a great place to have those discussions. I’m not an expert by any means, just have been following the news on this and related topics, so here’s a few off the cuff impressions.
I’ve been somewhat convinced that the US foreign policy aim and perhaps the best EA policy aim in relations with the current Chinese government is as stated by the hawkish American Senator Tom Cotton: “The ultimate objective of that strategy should be, to quote the document that launched this country’s ultimately successful strategy against the Soviet Union, the “breakup or the gradual mellowing” of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) power.”
This line of thinking runs strongly against my humanitarian and cooperative instincts, instead drawing on philosophies of realpolitik and international conflict to argue that the West and the current Chinese regime have fundamentally different interests and cannot cooperate in the long run. China wants to be the world’s #1 power and quite possibly has the power to do so within the coming decades or century. If the current incarnation of the CCP continues to lead China during this time, we might continue to see human rights abuses, mass surveillance, the persecution of dissent, and travesties like the Uighur concentration camps for the duration of the regime. Since the 1990s, Western foreign policy has attempted to cooperate with China any bringing them into our economic sphere and hoping political change will follow. Tom Cotton’s “Beat China” paper articulates an emerging counter-consensus arguing that this Chinese regime will not be co-opted and must instead be defeated in the traditional sense. He says:
“The challenges of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union all ended with total American victory; the Cold War was even won without direct military conflict. Once again, America confronts a powerful totalitarian adversary that seeks to dominate Eurasia and remake the world order, albeit with its own unique and subtle approach.”
This to me is a good candidate for the best EA position on the CCP and China relations. If EA had been around during the Cold War, I hope we would’ve been anti-Soviet (though perhaps not to Red Scare levels). If the Chinese regime is similarly totalitarian, we should aim for their replacement as well.
That’s only tangentially related to AUKUS, so to give some more direct thoughts:
I’m not sure why France was left out. One possibility is that nuclear subs were the crux to the deal, and that we could not form the deal without replacing France’s deal. But this seems unlikely, because the first nuclear subs under AUKUS will not be delivered until at least 2040(!!!). [1] Why didn’t we let France in on the deal?
One possibility is simply diplomatic incompetence. The US State Department has been gutted by hiring freezes and other legacies of the Trump administration, maybe we just forgot to take care of a crucial ally. But even then, there probably has to be some positive argument in favor of leaving out France.
One possibility that I have not seen discussed is that France has not contributed significantly to the NATO/Western military effort, having spent less than 2% of GDP on military for many years running [2]. If France will not contribute substantially, then perhaps the US and UK are finished giving France a free ride on their national defense and international prestige. The stakes are higher than they’ve been in 30 years; maybe it’s time to pay up or sit down. Of course, that’s all my baseless speculation.
Thanks Aidan, super helpful. I too have cooperative instincts but am very sceptical of China and the US ever being friendly without some sort of significant political change in China, though I believe this doesn’t necessarily require the downfall of the CCP, but could at least initially take the form of a more moderate / Western-sympathetic leader. It’s unclear how that will happen any time soon though.
On France, my understanding is that its exclusion is primarily down to (a) a strong preference for nuclear propulsion technology, which is held by the US and UK, and has not been shared with anyone else until now with Australia. It’s unclear what France would add in terms of military technology; (b) the Five Eyes agreement, which means there is already information sharing between the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Involving France in the information-sharing aspect of AUKUS would mean changing Five Eyes, which could be a long process and other Five Eyes members might not be up for it.
Not sure how much weight to give this, but I also sense that the UK, US and France are all particularly bad at foreign policy at the moment, in their individual respective ways. The UK has been pissing off European partners ever since the Brexit vote, and keeps getting into stupid arguments with France over things like fishing and refugee policy. The US withdrew from Afghanistan chaotically and without communicating with European allies, and it still has the hangovers from Trumpism which you mention. Meanwhile France seems to be annoying all its former colonies with failed diplomatic spats—e.g. Algeria, Lebanon—while also failing to inspire the military cooperation it wants within the EU.
Hey, this is a great topic and it’s really awesome that you’re writing a brief for such an influential audience. I haven’t seen and wouldn’t expect to see much EA-specific discussion of foreign policy, but I think this is a great place to have those discussions. I’m not an expert by any means, just have been following the news on this and related topics, so here’s a few off the cuff impressions.
I’ve been somewhat convinced that the US foreign policy aim and perhaps the best EA policy aim in relations with the current Chinese government is as stated by the hawkish American Senator Tom Cotton: “The ultimate objective of that strategy should be, to quote the document that launched this country’s ultimately successful strategy against the Soviet Union, the “breakup or the gradual mellowing” of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) power.”
This line of thinking runs strongly against my humanitarian and cooperative instincts, instead drawing on philosophies of realpolitik and international conflict to argue that the West and the current Chinese regime have fundamentally different interests and cannot cooperate in the long run. China wants to be the world’s #1 power and quite possibly has the power to do so within the coming decades or century. If the current incarnation of the CCP continues to lead China during this time, we might continue to see human rights abuses, mass surveillance, the persecution of dissent, and travesties like the Uighur concentration camps for the duration of the regime. Since the 1990s, Western foreign policy has attempted to cooperate with China any bringing them into our economic sphere and hoping political change will follow. Tom Cotton’s “Beat China” paper articulates an emerging counter-consensus arguing that this Chinese regime will not be co-opted and must instead be defeated in the traditional sense. He says:
“The challenges of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union all ended with total American victory; the Cold War was even won without direct military conflict. Once again, America confronts a powerful totalitarian adversary that seeks to dominate Eurasia and remake the world order, albeit with its own unique and subtle approach.”
This to me is a good candidate for the best EA position on the CCP and China relations. If EA had been around during the Cold War, I hope we would’ve been anti-Soviet (though perhaps not to Red Scare levels). If the Chinese regime is similarly totalitarian, we should aim for their replacement as well.
Here is the link: https://www.cotton.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/210216_1700_China Report_FINAL.pdf
That’s only tangentially related to AUKUS, so to give some more direct thoughts:
I’m not sure why France was left out. One possibility is that nuclear subs were the crux to the deal, and that we could not form the deal without replacing France’s deal. But this seems unlikely, because the first nuclear subs under AUKUS will not be delivered until at least 2040(!!!). [1] Why didn’t we let France in on the deal?
One possibility is simply diplomatic incompetence. The US State Department has been gutted by hiring freezes and other legacies of the Trump administration, maybe we just forgot to take care of a crucial ally. But even then, there probably has to be some positive argument in favor of leaving out France.
One possibility that I have not seen discussed is that France has not contributed significantly to the NATO/Western military effort, having spent less than 2% of GDP on military for many years running [2]. If France will not contribute substantially, then perhaps the US and UK are finished giving France a free ride on their national defense and international prestige. The stakes are higher than they’ve been in 30 years; maybe it’s time to pay up or sit down. Of course, that’s all my baseless speculation.
[1]https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/aukus-alliance-nuclearpowered-subs-will-arrive-too-late-to-help-us-in-conflict/news-story/8e7e2160542136db9cdadf05362a548d
[2] https://tradingeconomics.com/france/military-expenditure-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html
Thanks Aidan, super helpful. I too have cooperative instincts but am very sceptical of China and the US ever being friendly without some sort of significant political change in China, though I believe this doesn’t necessarily require the downfall of the CCP, but could at least initially take the form of a more moderate / Western-sympathetic leader. It’s unclear how that will happen any time soon though.
On France, my understanding is that its exclusion is primarily down to (a) a strong preference for nuclear propulsion technology, which is held by the US and UK, and has not been shared with anyone else until now with Australia. It’s unclear what France would add in terms of military technology; (b) the Five Eyes agreement, which means there is already information sharing between the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Involving France in the information-sharing aspect of AUKUS would mean changing Five Eyes, which could be a long process and other Five Eyes members might not be up for it.
Not sure how much weight to give this, but I also sense that the UK, US and France are all particularly bad at foreign policy at the moment, in their individual respective ways. The UK has been pissing off European partners ever since the Brexit vote, and keeps getting into stupid arguments with France over things like fishing and refugee policy. The US withdrew from Afghanistan chaotically and without communicating with European allies, and it still has the hangovers from Trumpism which you mention. Meanwhile France seems to be annoying all its former colonies with failed diplomatic spats—e.g. Algeria, Lebanon—while also failing to inspire the military cooperation it wants within the EU.