Red team: is it actually rational to have imprecise credences in possible longrun/indirect effects of our actions rather than precise ones?
Why: my understanding from Greaves (2016) and Mogensen (2020) is that this has been necessary to argue for the cluelessness worry.
This came up here. This paper was mentioned.
Imo, there are more important things than ensuring you can’t be Dutch booked like (having justified beliefs and avoiding fanaticism). Also, Dutch books are hard to guarantee against with unbounded preferences, anyway.
Red team: is it actually rational to have imprecise credences in possible longrun/indirect effects of our actions rather than precise ones?
Why: my understanding from Greaves (2016) and Mogensen (2020) is that this has been necessary to argue for the cluelessness worry.
This came up here. This paper was mentioned.
Imo, there are more important things than ensuring you can’t be Dutch booked like (having justified beliefs and avoiding fanaticism). Also, Dutch books are hard to guarantee against with unbounded preferences, anyway.