Interesting! This is a very surprising result to me because I am mostly used to hearing about how cost effective pandemic prevention is and this estimate seems to disagree with that.
Shouldnât this be a relatively major point against prioritizing biorisk as a cause area? (at least w/âo taking into account strong long termism and the moral catastrophe of extinction)
Not really. This postâs cost-effectiveness calculation was done at the cause area level, so itâs an average of many interventions of highly varying cost-effectiveness, while GW top charitiesâ cost-eff are evaluated at the (org-specific) intervention level.
This is a very surprising result to me because I am mostly used to hearing about how cost effective pandemic prevention is and this estimate seems to disagree with that.
Note that the cost-effectiveness of epidemic/âpandemic preparedness I got of 0.00236 DALY/â$ is still quite high. The value of a statistical life in high income countries is around 1 to 10 M$, which, for 51 DALY averted per life saved[1], leads to 5.10*10^-6 (= 51/â(10*10^6)) to 5.10*10^-5 DALY/â$ (= 51/â10^6), i.e. 0.216 % (= 5.10*10^-6/â0.00236) to 2.16 % (= 5.10*10^-5/â0.00236) of my estimate for the cost-effectiveness of epidemic/âpandemic preparedness.
Shouldnât this be a relatively major point against prioritizing biorisk as a cause area?
Not so much for prioritising global health and development over biorisk, since GiveWellâs top charities being 4.21 times as cost-effective is not much considering uncertainty in my estimates. However, I would say definitely so for prioritising animal welfare over biorisk.
(at least w/âo taking into account strong long termism and the moral catastrophe of extinction)
According to Open Philanthropy, âGiveWell uses moral weights for child deaths that would be consistent with assuming 51 years of foregone life in the DALY framework (though that is not how they reach the conclusion)â.
Note that the cost-effectiveness of epidemic/âpandemic preparedness I got of 0.00236 DALY/â$ is still quite high.
Point well-taken.
I appreciate you writing and sharing those posts trying to model and quantify the impact of x-risk work and question the common arguments given for astronomical EV.
I hope to take a look at those more in depth some time and critically assess what I think about them. Honestly, I am very intrigued by engaging with well informed disagreement around the astronomical EV of x-risk focused approaches. I find your perspective here interesting and I think engaging with it might sharpen my own understanding.
Interesting! This is a very surprising result to me because I am mostly used to hearing about how cost effective pandemic prevention is and this estimate seems to disagree with that.
Shouldnât this be a relatively major point against prioritizing biorisk as a cause area? (at least w/âo taking into account strong long termism and the moral catastrophe of extinction)
Not really. This postâs cost-effectiveness calculation was done at the cause area level, so itâs an average of many interventions of highly varying cost-effectiveness, while GW top charitiesâ cost-eff are evaluated at the (org-specific) intervention level.
Thanks for the comment, Jacob!
Note that the cost-effectiveness of epidemic/âpandemic preparedness I got of 0.00236 DALY/â$ is still quite high. The value of a statistical life in high income countries is around 1 to 10 M$, which, for 51 DALY averted per life saved[1], leads to 5.10*10^-6 (= 51/â(10*10^6)) to 5.10*10^-5 DALY/â$ (= 51/â10^6), i.e. 0.216 % (= 5.10*10^-6/â0.00236) to 2.16 % (= 5.10*10^-5/â0.00236) of my estimate for the cost-effectiveness of epidemic/âpandemic preparedness.
Not so much for prioritising global health and development over biorisk, since GiveWellâs top charities being 4.21 times as cost-effective is not much considering uncertainty in my estimates. However, I would say definitely so for prioritising animal welfare over biorisk.
It is unclear to me whether such considerations would lead to prioritising biorisk, even under expected total hedonistic utilitarianism (which I strongly endorse).
According to Open Philanthropy, âGiveWell uses moral weights for child deaths that would be consistent with assuming 51 years of foregone life in the DALY framework (though that is not how they reach the conclusion)â.
Point well-taken.
I appreciate you writing and sharing those posts trying to model and quantify the impact of x-risk work and question the common arguments given for astronomical EV.
I hope to take a look at those more in depth some time and critically assess what I think about them. Honestly, I am very intrigued by engaging with well informed disagreement around the astronomical EV of x-risk focused approaches. I find your perspective here interesting and I think engaging with it might sharpen my own understanding.
:)
Thanks, Jacob! That is nice to know.