Executive summary: The author argues against functionalist theories of consciousness, presenting intuition pumps and considerations that point to consciousness being a fundamental physical phenomenon rather than an emergent property of computations.
Key points:
Computation in the brain may rely on physical properties beyond neural networks, as seen in single-cell organisms and optical computing.
The “binding problem” of unified conscious experience is difficult to explain through functionalism.
Consciousness may be an invariant physical property rather than a fuzzy, observer-dependent phenomenon.
Viewing consciousness as fundamental avoids issues of strong emergence faced by functionalist theories.
Physics-based theories of consciousness could potentially be more satisfying and explanatory than functionalist accounts.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, andcontact us if you have feedback.
Executive summary: The author argues against functionalist theories of consciousness, presenting intuition pumps and considerations that point to consciousness being a fundamental physical phenomenon rather than an emergent property of computations.
Key points:
Computation in the brain may rely on physical properties beyond neural networks, as seen in single-cell organisms and optical computing.
The “binding problem” of unified conscious experience is difficult to explain through functionalism.
Consciousness may be an invariant physical property rather than a fuzzy, observer-dependent phenomenon.
Viewing consciousness as fundamental avoids issues of strong emergence faced by functionalist theories.
Physics-based theories of consciousness could potentially be more satisfying and explanatory than functionalist accounts.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.