My understanding of your objection is that in the public discussion, personal autonomy is framed as a right, but in my post, itâs framed more as the ability to make choices which affect oneâs personal life. You believe that the latter framing insufficiently addresses the external forces which prevent some from exercising their personal autonomy, which you view as fundamental to the discussion of personal autonomy with respect to abortion. (Please let me know if anything about my characterization of your objection is incorrect, since this is the characterization Iâll be responding to.)
I think there are two reasons why weâre not seeing eye-to-eye on your objection:
Credence in utilitarianism versus deontology:
I hold much higher credence in utilitarianism than deontology, so I normally wouldnât speak of a ârightâ to free speech, or a ârightâ to personal autonomy, etc. Instead, I would frame free speech and personal autonomy as important normsâthe ability to choose what to say and the ability to choose what happens in oneâs personal lifeâwhich are instrumentally useful in realizing the utilitarian goal.
Your higher weighing of deontology seems like a factor in the greater focus you place on rights, which affects the insistence with which you believe external forces should have been addressed in the post.
Scope considerations:
In a post on voluntary hate speech reduction, I could write a section entitled âExercising Free Speech to Help Othersâ where I argue that even though free speech is a very important norm, we shouldnât make the choice to use our free speech to spread hate. Because the postâs scope specifically concerns voluntary interventions, I wouldnât feel it pressing to address external forces which prevent some from exercising their free speech (hate speech laws in Europe, repression in North Korea, etc) as theyâre out of scope.
As for your perspective, Iâm not sure whether your opinion is (a) that this postâs scope should be broader or (b) that even given this postâs stated scope, itâs still worth it to address the external forces you brought up.
Re: your characterization of my argument, framng personally autonomy as a right or an ability is a distinction without much difference here unless you argue that external forces that would change your right to have a child or an abortion doesnât effect your ability to have one, which is obviously untrue. If someone wants to have an abortion where itâs illegal, their ability to get an abortion is seriously constrained. Of someone wants to have a child where having children is illegal, their ability to have a child is seriously constrained as well. Ignoring this is either a myopic oversight or ignorant of the way political, economic, legal and social systems impact peopleâs choices and ability to make choices in the world. This also applies to your point on âCredence in deontology vs. utilitarianismââI donât see how a utilitarian or deontological framework changes this at all.
More importantly, the framing of voluntary abortion reduction means that people should choose to not do a certain thing, not they should or should be able to choose it. This doesnât immediately clash with personal autonomy as either of us have defined it when your proposition is formed as âpeople who want to have children should be able to have themâ, but when you form it as âpeople who are pregnant should have their childrenâ (which seems to me to be the actual argument of the post, based on the post and your comments) it is no longer a question of ability but of choice.
The reason I find the use of personal autonomy in the post objectionable is because using a term that is central to extant debates in a way that is disconnected from and unrelated to its use in those debates implies that it is response to those arguments without actually engaging with them. This was a bigger problem when the title was personal autonomy does not preclude intervention, but i still think the bidyif the section itself reads as disingenuous in a similar way. Debates around personal autonomy in relation to abortion are not about how one should exersize their personal autonomy, they are about whether or not pregnant people should have the right to exercise their personal autonomy. These are two different arguments and the language functions as semantic tool to separate them. Treating them as if they are the same is unproductive and incorrect, so differentiating between them is necessary.
âwhere I argue that even though free speech is a very important norm, we shouldnât make the choice to use our free speech to spread hate.â
I think this comparison fails because, although personal autonomy is a very important norm, the right to personal autonomy if pregnant people is being weakened or completely stripped away in many places in the world. Additionally, you are ostensibly making an argument in favor of personal autonomy (people should be able to have and raise ot adopt children if they want to), not against it (people should not be able to have abortions). This, to me, makes personal autonomy irrelevant to your proposal because you are arguing for a moral prescription because it is a prescription on how one should choose to act not on how they have the ability to act.
âAs for your perspective, Iâm not sure whether your opinion is (a) that this postâs scope should be broader or (b) that even given this postâs stated scope, itâs still worth it to address the external forces you brought up.â
I think that arguing against abortion without bringing up these external forces and the realities of pregnancy is deeply flawed. Although you make a passing concession to the costs of pregnancy in your post, I do think that these costs are severely minimized. Being pregnant and giving birth to a child, particular particularly an unwanted one, is extremely burdensome for women economically, socially, mentally and physically. Somewhere in a comment thread you argued that if kidneys were regenerative, EAs would be arguing that everyone should donate kidneys once a year. I think this comparison makes it clear how much these costs are being minimized; having a child once a year, even if they didnât raise the children themselves, would likely have disastrous effects for the women doing it very quickly. Likewise, arguing that personal autonomy should be using in a certain way without recognizing that many women do not have the personal autonomy to make a choice at all feels callous at best.
My understanding of your objection is that in the public discussion, personal autonomy is framed as a right, but in my post, itâs framed more as the ability to make choices which affect oneâs personal life. You believe that the latter framing insufficiently addresses the external forces which prevent some from exercising their personal autonomy, which you view as fundamental to the discussion of personal autonomy with respect to abortion. (Please let me know if anything about my characterization of your objection is incorrect, since this is the characterization Iâll be responding to.)
I think there are two reasons why weâre not seeing eye-to-eye on your objection:
Credence in utilitarianism versus deontology:
I hold much higher credence in utilitarianism than deontology, so I normally wouldnât speak of a ârightâ to free speech, or a ârightâ to personal autonomy, etc. Instead, I would frame free speech and personal autonomy as important normsâthe ability to choose what to say and the ability to choose what happens in oneâs personal lifeâwhich are instrumentally useful in realizing the utilitarian goal.
Your higher weighing of deontology seems like a factor in the greater focus you place on rights, which affects the insistence with which you believe external forces should have been addressed in the post.
Scope considerations:
In a post on voluntary hate speech reduction, I could write a section entitled âExercising Free Speech to Help Othersâ where I argue that even though free speech is a very important norm, we shouldnât make the choice to use our free speech to spread hate. Because the postâs scope specifically concerns voluntary interventions, I wouldnât feel it pressing to address external forces which prevent some from exercising their free speech (hate speech laws in Europe, repression in North Korea, etc) as theyâre out of scope.
As for your perspective, Iâm not sure whether your opinion is (a) that this postâs scope should be broader or (b) that even given this postâs stated scope, itâs still worth it to address the external forces you brought up.
(On mobile and canât do quotes)
Re: your characterization of my argument, framng personally autonomy as a right or an ability is a distinction without much difference here unless you argue that external forces that would change your right to have a child or an abortion doesnât effect your ability to have one, which is obviously untrue. If someone wants to have an abortion where itâs illegal, their ability to get an abortion is seriously constrained. Of someone wants to have a child where having children is illegal, their ability to have a child is seriously constrained as well. Ignoring this is either a myopic oversight or ignorant of the way political, economic, legal and social systems impact peopleâs choices and ability to make choices in the world. This also applies to your point on âCredence in deontology vs. utilitarianismââI donât see how a utilitarian or deontological framework changes this at all.
More importantly, the framing of voluntary abortion reduction means that people should choose to not do a certain thing, not they should or should be able to choose it. This doesnât immediately clash with personal autonomy as either of us have defined it when your proposition is formed as âpeople who want to have children should be able to have themâ, but when you form it as âpeople who are pregnant should have their childrenâ (which seems to me to be the actual argument of the post, based on the post and your comments) it is no longer a question of ability but of choice.
The reason I find the use of personal autonomy in the post objectionable is because using a term that is central to extant debates in a way that is disconnected from and unrelated to its use in those debates implies that it is response to those arguments without actually engaging with them. This was a bigger problem when the title was personal autonomy does not preclude intervention, but i still think the bidyif the section itself reads as disingenuous in a similar way. Debates around personal autonomy in relation to abortion are not about how one should exersize their personal autonomy, they are about whether or not pregnant people should have the right to exercise their personal autonomy. These are two different arguments and the language functions as semantic tool to separate them. Treating them as if they are the same is unproductive and incorrect, so differentiating between them is necessary.
âwhere I argue that even though free speech is a very important norm, we shouldnât make the choice to use our free speech to spread hate.â
I think this comparison fails because, although personal autonomy is a very important norm, the right to personal autonomy if pregnant people is being weakened or completely stripped away in many places in the world. Additionally, you are ostensibly making an argument in favor of personal autonomy (people should be able to have and raise ot adopt children if they want to), not against it (people should not be able to have abortions). This, to me, makes personal autonomy irrelevant to your proposal because you are arguing for a moral prescription because it is a prescription on how one should choose to act not on how they have the ability to act.
âAs for your perspective, Iâm not sure whether your opinion is (a) that this postâs scope should be broader or (b) that even given this postâs stated scope, itâs still worth it to address the external forces you brought up.â
I think that arguing against abortion without bringing up these external forces and the realities of pregnancy is deeply flawed. Although you make a passing concession to the costs of pregnancy in your post, I do think that these costs are severely minimized. Being pregnant and giving birth to a child, particular particularly an unwanted one, is extremely burdensome for women economically, socially, mentally and physically. Somewhere in a comment thread you argued that if kidneys were regenerative, EAs would be arguing that everyone should donate kidneys once a year. I think this comparison makes it clear how much these costs are being minimized; having a child once a year, even if they didnât raise the children themselves, would likely have disastrous effects for the women doing it very quickly. Likewise, arguing that personal autonomy should be using in a certain way without recognizing that many women do not have the personal autonomy to make a choice at all feels callous at best.