Hi Ben! Thanks for a well-researched and balanced description of the competing theories of fetal pain development.
I donât have much to add on fetal pain (since you covered it so thoroughly!), but I am curious about your opinion on person-affecting versus non-person-affecting views in population ethics. It seems that your moral opinion on abortion stems from a belief that a person must already be conscious/âable to suffer in order to be a moral patientâi.e. a person-affecting view. In that regard, you posit that the time at which a fetusâs capacity to experience pain begins is a critical juncture. However, many EAs hold relatively non-person-affecting views, which often compels them to act in the interests of people who will live in the far future, and have no hope of experiencing pain right now. Those EAs would be less likely to consider the point at which a fetus begins to experience pain to be a critical juncture.
I do take a non-person-affecting view, but with a sort of deontological barrier around doing things that could cause substantial harm to a large number of currently-existing people, particularly in areas I regard as âhuman rightsâ. This is not the only area Iâd endorse this sort of deontological barrier. I also endorse one against committing dishonesty or fraud in the name of things that might harm the long term future, and recent events have strengthened my view on that.
There are a couple of justifications for this. First, we should have a certain amount of epistemic humility, where at some point itâs just really hard to understand what effects of current acts on the long term future will be, and we better be really sure if we cause present harm for the sake of far-future good. I have a certain amount of loss aversion when it comes to working out what sort of acts I should do. Second, we might want certain values to be sustained into the long term future, like honesty and respect for human rights, because sustaining those values will be good for future society. That might be a reason that doing things in the name of honesty or human rights that might, on the balance, have negative direct effects for the long-term future, could actually end up having long-term positive effects.
On this particular issue, Iâm at least moderately pro-natalist. I think the vast majority of possible good we can do in the present to improve the long term future is just to avoid existential risk, so I donât hugely emphasize pro-natalism. One reason is itâs not clear whether a larger population now will lead to a large population in 200 years, since future generations might compensate for higher fertility now with less fertility in their time, as long as there are resource constraints given current technologies. But on balance I do support pro-natalism, not just because of the long term future, but also because more present people enjoying the present is good. Having said that, I think the restriction on womensâ autonomy is a high cost to pay, and we might be able to get equivalent boosts in fertility through other policies, like letting children vote, providing much more financial support for parents at low incomes, and more favorable tax treatment for parents at all income levels, by, for instance, allowing not just spouses to file jointly but allowing parents to also file jointly with their children.
I worry I wasnât actually fair enough to the â12 week fetal painâ theoryâthe more I think about the paper I read yesterday, the more I actually prefer it, all things considered, to its alternative, and Iâll update my post on that basis.
Hi Ben! Thanks for a well-researched and balanced description of the competing theories of fetal pain development.
I donât have much to add on fetal pain (since you covered it so thoroughly!), but I am curious about your opinion on person-affecting versus non-person-affecting views in population ethics. It seems that your moral opinion on abortion stems from a belief that a person must already be conscious/âable to suffer in order to be a moral patientâi.e. a person-affecting view. In that regard, you posit that the time at which a fetusâs capacity to experience pain begins is a critical juncture. However, many EAs hold relatively non-person-affecting views, which often compels them to act in the interests of people who will live in the far future, and have no hope of experiencing pain right now. Those EAs would be less likely to consider the point at which a fetus begins to experience pain to be a critical juncture.
I do take a non-person-affecting view, but with a sort of deontological barrier around doing things that could cause substantial harm to a large number of currently-existing people, particularly in areas I regard as âhuman rightsâ. This is not the only area Iâd endorse this sort of deontological barrier. I also endorse one against committing dishonesty or fraud in the name of things that might harm the long term future, and recent events have strengthened my view on that.
There are a couple of justifications for this. First, we should have a certain amount of epistemic humility, where at some point itâs just really hard to understand what effects of current acts on the long term future will be, and we better be really sure if we cause present harm for the sake of far-future good. I have a certain amount of loss aversion when it comes to working out what sort of acts I should do. Second, we might want certain values to be sustained into the long term future, like honesty and respect for human rights, because sustaining those values will be good for future society. That might be a reason that doing things in the name of honesty or human rights that might, on the balance, have negative direct effects for the long-term future, could actually end up having long-term positive effects.
On this particular issue, Iâm at least moderately pro-natalist. I think the vast majority of possible good we can do in the present to improve the long term future is just to avoid existential risk, so I donât hugely emphasize pro-natalism. One reason is itâs not clear whether a larger population now will lead to a large population in 200 years, since future generations might compensate for higher fertility now with less fertility in their time, as long as there are resource constraints given current technologies. But on balance I do support pro-natalism, not just because of the long term future, but also because more present people enjoying the present is good. Having said that, I think the restriction on womensâ autonomy is a high cost to pay, and we might be able to get equivalent boosts in fertility through other policies, like letting children vote, providing much more financial support for parents at low incomes, and more favorable tax treatment for parents at all income levels, by, for instance, allowing not just spouses to file jointly but allowing parents to also file jointly with their children.
I worry I wasnât actually fair enough to the â12 week fetal painâ theoryâthe more I think about the paper I read yesterday, the more I actually prefer it, all things considered, to its alternative, and Iâll update my post on that basis.
Thanks for your thorough and clear writeup!