Coming here a month late, I’d like to give some contrast to the other commenter:
This was very interesting and I didn’t find a need for clarification of what the aims of the post were. Though this may just be because I share what I understood to be the aim: to make EA consider outside moral theories much more openly, and be aware that what we count as “Good” when we try to maximise doing good, may not be the same as what other people do (in particular, those whom we’re trying to help).
But—I found it hard to understand some parts because background knowledge was assumed that I don’t have: in particular, I don’t know what a “moral ought” is, nor a “prudential ought”, nor indeed what “ought” means as a noun. I certainly was not familiar* with Haidt’s theory (which you nicely explained), and I expect most people reading this to not yet be familiar with it.
*I happen to have bought Haidt’s book some years ago, but I haven’t read it yet and this doesn’t change my point.
Coming here a month late, I’d like to give some contrast to the other commenter:
This was very interesting and I didn’t find a need for clarification of what the aims of the post were. Though this may just be because I share what I understood to be the aim: to make EA consider outside moral theories much more openly, and be aware that what we count as “Good” when we try to maximise doing good, may not be the same as what other people do (in particular, those whom we’re trying to help).
But—I found it hard to understand some parts because background knowledge was assumed that I don’t have: in particular, I don’t know what a “moral ought” is, nor a “prudential ought”, nor indeed what “ought” means as a noun. I certainly was not familiar* with Haidt’s theory (which you nicely explained), and I expect most people reading this to not yet be familiar with it.
*I happen to have bought Haidt’s book some years ago, but I haven’t read it yet and this doesn’t change my point.