Thanks for the interesting post, Matt and Alejandro!
(Weāre happy to share all code and all datasets, etc. to interested parties. Just reach out!)
Would it be better to simply share the code and datasets to save people time, and do not accidentally dissuade some people?
In July, Nematode was a more popular keyword than existential risk. Is that appropriate? Idkā¦ you tell me
Nice to know! Since you asked, yes. I estimate soil nematodes have 169 times as many neurons in total as humans, and ā306 k times as much welfare in total.
On the code sharing. Yes, I thought about it, but it would take us a bit of effort to pull it all together and publish it online, I didnāt want to spend that effort if no one was going to get value from it. So far, no one has found the courage and 3 seconds of effort to put a comment asking for the data/ācode (or more likely, people just donāt want to spend the time wading through the code/ādata)
On nematodes, I think 169x the total number of neurons compared to humans is a poor/āconfused way to attempt to measure total welfare. And I think the second order effects of trying to convince people they should care about nemotodes (unless they are already diehard EA) is likely net negative for the animal suffering cause at large.
On the code sharing. Yes, I thought about it, but it would take us a bit of effort to pull it all together and publish it online, I didnāt want to spend that effort if no one was going to get value from it.
Got it.
On nematodes, I think 169x the total number of neurons compared to humans is a poor/āconfused way to attempt to measure total welfare.
Which metric would you use to compare welfare across species? āWelfare range (difference between the maximum and minimum welfare per unit time) as a fraction of that of humansā = ānumber of neurons as a fraction of that of humansā^0.188 explains78.6 % of the variance in the welfare ranges as a fraction of that of humans in Bob Fischerās book about comparing animal welfare across species. The exponent of 0.188 is much smaller than 1, which suggests the total number of neurons underestimate a lot the absolute value of the welfare of soil animals relative to that of humans.
And I think the second order effects of trying to convince people they should care about nemotodes (unless they are already diehard EA) is likely net negative for the animal suffering cause at large.
I estimate interventions targeting farmed animals change the welfare of soil animals way more than that of farmed animals. So I think advocating for soil animals (of which the vast majority are soil nematodes) would have to decrease the welfare of these for it to decrease global animal welfare.
Which metric would you use to compare welfare across species?
I donāt think we know enough about consciousness/āqualia/āetc. to say anything with conviction about what itās like to be a nematode. And operationally, I donāt think you wonāt be able to convince enough people/āfunders to take real action on soil animals because itās just too epistemically unsound and doesnāt fit into peopleās natural world views.
When I say net negative, I donāt mean if you try to help soil animals you somehow hurt more animals on the whole.
I mean that you will turn people away from the theory of animal suffering because advocating for soil animals will make them think the field/āstudy of animal suffering as a whole is less epistemically sound or even common sense as they previously thought.
Iām going to write a post next week about this, but consider the backlash on twitter regarding Benthamās Bulldogās post about bees and honey. More people came out in force against him than for him. I think that post, for instance, reduced the appetite for animal suffering discussion/āaction
Thanks. Just one note. There is no need for people to care about soil animals to help these. I estimate the cheapest ways of saving human lives increase the welfare of soil animals much more cost-effectively than interventions targeting farmed animals, and lots of people already care about saving children in low income countries. Saving humans increases the production of food, this increases agricultural land, and this decreases the number of soil animals, which is good for my best guess they have negative lives. If one guesses they have positive lives, one can advocate for cost-effective forestation efforts, which also population already, and does not require convincing people to care about soil animals.
Thanks for the interesting post, Matt and Alejandro!
Would it be better to simply share the code and datasets to save people time, and do not accidentally dissuade some people?
Nice to know! Since you asked, yes. I estimate soil nematodes have 169 times as many neurons in total as humans, and ā306 k times as much welfare in total.
Thank you!
On the code sharing. Yes, I thought about it, but it would take us a bit of effort to pull it all together and publish it online, I didnāt want to spend that effort if no one was going to get value from it. So far, no one has found the courage and 3 seconds of effort to put a comment asking for the data/ācode (or more likely, people just donāt want to spend the time wading through the code/ādata)
On nematodes, I think 169x the total number of neurons compared to humans is a poor/āconfused way to attempt to measure total welfare. And I think the second order effects of trying to convince people they should care about nemotodes (unless they are already diehard EA) is likely net negative for the animal suffering cause at large.
Thanks, Matt.
Got it.
Which metric would you use to compare welfare across species? āWelfare range (difference between the maximum and minimum welfare per unit time) as a fraction of that of humansā = ānumber of neurons as a fraction of that of humansā^0.188 explains 78.6 % of the variance in the welfare ranges as a fraction of that of humans in Bob Fischerās book about comparing animal welfare across species. The exponent of 0.188 is much smaller than 1, which suggests the total number of neurons underestimate a lot the absolute value of the welfare of soil animals relative to that of humans.
I estimate interventions targeting farmed animals change the welfare of soil animals way more than that of farmed animals. So I think advocating for soil animals (of which the vast majority are soil nematodes) would have to decrease the welfare of these for it to decrease global animal welfare.
I donāt think we know enough about consciousness/āqualia/āetc. to say anything with conviction about what itās like to be a nematode. And operationally, I donāt think you wonāt be able to convince enough people/āfunders to take real action on soil animals because itās just too epistemically unsound and doesnāt fit into peopleās natural world views.
When I say net negative, I donāt mean if you try to help soil animals you somehow hurt more animals on the whole.
I mean that you will turn people away from the theory of animal suffering because advocating for soil animals will make them think the field/āstudy of animal suffering as a whole is less epistemically sound or even common sense as they previously thought.
Iām going to write a post next week about this, but consider the backlash on twitter regarding Benthamās Bulldogās post about bees and honey. More people came out in force against him than for him. I think that post, for instance, reduced the appetite for animal suffering discussion/āaction
Thanks. Just one note. There is no need for people to care about soil animals to help these. I estimate the cheapest ways of saving human lives increase the welfare of soil animals much more cost-effectively than interventions targeting farmed animals, and lots of people already care about saving children in low income countries. Saving humans increases the production of food, this increases agricultural land, and this decreases the number of soil animals, which is good for my best guess they have negative lives. If one guesses they have positive lives, one can advocate for cost-effective forestation efforts, which also population already, and does not require convincing people to care about soil animals.