On section “3.) Decorticate rats are not conscious”, for what it’s worth, I lean towards higher-order-ish illusionist theories*, and I’d guess that mammals and birds have some higher-order representations/do some self-modelling, enough to be conscious on such theories that don’t require full self-awareness. See my comments here and here for some behavioural evidence. I’d also want to check for this kind of behavioural evidence in (functionally or physically) decorticate rats before concluding either way about their possible consciousness.
* Something like Attention Schema Theory, although I think we should consider including certain kinds of models of things besides attention, e.g. body schemas (which many animals are likely to have), colour schemas, and so on, as also potentially generating conscious experience. Maybe all that will matter ethically will be something like schemas of suffering, pleasure and/or desires. I don’t give much weight to theories that require full self-awareness.
On section “3.) Decorticate rats are not conscious”, for what it’s worth, I lean towards higher-order-ish illusionist theories*, and I’d guess that mammals and birds have some higher-order representations/do some self-modelling, enough to be conscious on such theories that don’t require full self-awareness. See my comments here and here for some behavioural evidence. I’d also want to check for this kind of behavioural evidence in (functionally or physically) decorticate rats before concluding either way about their possible consciousness.
* Something like Attention Schema Theory, although I think we should consider including certain kinds of models of things besides attention, e.g. body schemas (which many animals are likely to have), colour schemas, and so on, as also potentially generating conscious experience. Maybe all that will matter ethically will be something like schemas of suffering, pleasure and/or desires. I don’t give much weight to theories that require full self-awareness.