0.0374 % is my best guess, but I agree there is lots of uncertainty. For an exponent of the number of neurons of 0.188, which explains pretty well the welfare ranges in Bobās book about comparing animal welfare across species, the effects on soil animals would dominate even more easily. However, I would also not be surprised if 100 times as much consumption of the affected farmed shrimp, 3.74 % (= 100*3.74*10^-4), would have to be replaced by farmed fish for effects on soil animals to dominate, in which case I could easily electrically stunning shrimp increasing animal welfare.
My main takeaway from the section where I discuss eletrically stunning shrimp is that I do not really know whether it increases or decreases welfare. I would still believe this even if my preferred way of comparing welfare across species was certain to be right. There is plenty of uncertainty in whether electrically stunning farmed shrimps increases or decreases the welfare of soil animals, and in the replacement of the consumption of farmed shrimps by other foods.
I agree decreasing the uncertainty about comparing welfare across different potential beings should also be a priority. I just feel it is very hard to make progress on this in comparison to gaining a better understanding of the conditions of soil animals in different biomes.
My main takeaway from the section where I discuss eletrically stunning shrimp is that I do not really know whether it increases or decreases welfare. I would still believe this even if my preferred way of comparing welfare across species was certain to be right. There is plenty of uncertainty in whether electrically stunning farmed shrimps increases or decreases the welfare of soil animals, and in the replacement of the consumption of farmed shrimps by other foods.
Yup, agreed species tradeoffs are not the only source of deep uncertainty.
I agree decreasing the uncertainty about comparing welfare across different potential beings should also be a priority. I just feel it is very hard to make progress on this in comparison to gaining a better understanding of the conditions of soil animals in different biomes.
To be clear, to me, āmaking progressā may mean realizing that we should be and (tentatively?) remain deeply uncertain about inter-species tradeoffs[1] and hence prioritize interventions that are most likely good independently of (non-obvious) tradeoffs assumptions (e.g., interventions that are ecologically inert and avoid substitution effects, or close to that). I could imagine myself reaching such a conclusion quite quickly after diving into the literature on inter-species tradeoffs.[2]
For instance, I wouldnāt be surprised if I find out that anyoneās precise-ish moral weights inevitably depend on way-too-strong assumptions about the nature of consciousness and how the importance of suffering scales with its severity.
To be clear, to me, āmaking progressā may mean realizing that we should be and (tentatively?) remain deeply uncertain about inter-species tradeoffs[1] and hence prioritize interventions that are most likely good independently of (non-obvious) tradeoffs assumptions (e.g., interventions that are ecologically inert and avoid substitution effects, or close to that).
I am very pessimistic about finding interventions that robustly increase welfare in expectation in my view across all reasonably plausible ways of comparing welfare across individuals. In addition, I would be surprised if such interventions were the ones increasing welfare the most cost-effectively.
I partly share your pessimism. I hope weāll have occasions to discuss specific proposals soon!
I would be surprised if such interventions were the ones increasing welfare the most cost-effectively.
If you define cost-effectiveness as something close to āwhatās best in expectation according to my specific favorite among all the plausible ways of comparing welfare across individualsā, I agree. I would also be surprised. Iām justāas you probably have realizedāvery sympathetic to Anthony and Malās arguments (in the above-linked posts) that this is not what we should look for when we seek cost-effectiveness.
I saw you already discussed this and adjacent cruxes with them. I might write something relevant to this (precise vs imprecise beliefs, etc.) in the very context of moral weights at some point. Iāll reach back to you then, and maybe weāll be able to hit finer-grained cruxes and advance this discussion. :)
If you define cost-effectiveness as something close to āwhatās best in expectation according to my specific favorite among all the plausible ways of comparing welfare across individualsā, I agree.
Yes, that is how I was thinking about it, with the caveat that the specific favourite would involve weighting many ways of comparing welfare by their plausibility, at least implicitly.
I saw you already discussed this and adjacent cruxes with them. I might write something relevant to this (precise vs imprecise beliefs, etc.) in the very context of moral weights at some point. Iāll reach back to you then, and maybe weāll be able to hit finer-grained cruxes and advance this discussion. :)
I [Jim] think maybe we should be more uncertain about inter-species tradeoffs than you seem to be, here.
I agree I have underestimated the uncertainty in comparisons between the individual (expectedhedonistic) welfare per unit time of different species. I now recommend decreasing this uncertainty.
Thanks for the comment, Jim!
0.0374 % is my best guess, but I agree there is lots of uncertainty. For an exponent of the number of neurons of 0.188, which explains pretty well the welfare ranges in Bobās book about comparing animal welfare across species, the effects on soil animals would dominate even more easily. However, I would also not be surprised if 100 times as much consumption of the affected farmed shrimp, 3.74 % (= 100*3.74*10^-4), would have to be replaced by farmed fish for effects on soil animals to dominate, in which case I could easily electrically stunning shrimp increasing animal welfare.
My main takeaway from the section where I discuss eletrically stunning shrimp is that I do not really know whether it increases or decreases welfare. I would still believe this even if my preferred way of comparing welfare across species was certain to be right. There is plenty of uncertainty in whether electrically stunning farmed shrimps increases or decreases the welfare of soil animals, and in the replacement of the consumption of farmed shrimps by other foods.
I agree decreasing the uncertainty about comparing welfare across different potential beings should also be a priority. I just feel it is very hard to make progress on this in comparison to gaining a better understanding of the conditions of soil animals in different biomes.
Yup, agreed species tradeoffs are not the only source of deep uncertainty.
To be clear, to me, āmaking progressā may mean realizing that we should be and (tentatively?) remain deeply uncertain about inter-species tradeoffs[1] and hence prioritize interventions that are most likely good independently of (non-obvious) tradeoffs assumptions (e.g., interventions that are ecologically inert and avoid substitution effects, or close to that). I could imagine myself reaching such a conclusion quite quickly after diving into the literature on inter-species tradeoffs.[2]
Much more than what the moral weight project suggests us to be.
For instance, I wouldnāt be surprised if I find out that anyoneās precise-ish moral weights inevitably depend on way-too-strong assumptions about the nature of consciousness and how the importance of suffering scales with its severity.
I am very pessimistic about finding interventions that robustly increase welfare in expectation in my view across all reasonably plausible ways of comparing welfare across individuals. In addition, I would be surprised if such interventions were the ones increasing welfare the most cost-effectively.
I partly share your pessimism. I hope weāll have occasions to discuss specific proposals soon!
If you define cost-effectiveness as something close to āwhatās best in expectation according to my specific favorite among all the plausible ways of comparing welfare across individualsā, I agree. I would also be surprised. Iām justāas you probably have realizedāvery sympathetic to Anthony and Malās arguments (in the above-linked posts) that this is not what we should look for when we seek cost-effectiveness.
I saw you already discussed this and adjacent cruxes with them. I might write something relevant to this (precise vs imprecise beliefs, etc.) in the very context of moral weights at some point. Iāll reach back to you then, and maybe weāll be able to hit finer-grained cruxes and advance this discussion. :)
Yes, that is how I was thinking about it, with the caveat that the specific favourite would involve weighting many ways of comparing welfare by their plausibility, at least implicitly.
Thanks for letting me know!
I agree I have underestimated the uncertainty in comparisons between the individual (expected hedonistic) welfare per unit time of different species. I now recommend decreasing this uncertainty.
Interesting, thanks for the update!