I think your assumptions around the costs and their even distributions over three years would need to be refined a bit more to work out more precisely the areas in which the proposed intervention would or would not reduce costs. To my reading of the research you cite here, the costs include things such as prevention programs and and police, court, and prison costs in dealing with the perpetrator etc., as opposed to just costs experienced by the victim (which I think you are right are also not just linearly experienced over the years). I therefore think it would be useful parcellate out more specifically which aspects of the costs you think would be reduced.
This is a good point. I may be misinterpreting the cited research, but if the proposed training increases disclosures of CSA, that will (a) presumably reduce ‘costs as a consequence’ (which includes a monetised value of the physical and emotional harm suffered) but (b) plausibly increase ‘costs in response’ (due to increased police, prison, and safeguarding costs)
That’s exactly the kind of nuance I was hoping to get. Sharp by name, sharp by nature! Yes, if there are increased disclosures then it follows that costs as a response will go up. However, that in turn could have a deterrent effect.
If it would turn out that the response costs outweigh the savings, then from a purely costs perspective, the most cost efficient thing could be to… do nothing. Don’t try to prevent CSA once the harm is already there.
Response costs should probably be treated as either neutral or as part of the justice system’s baseline functioning, rather than as part of the marginal calculation. Which, of course, would change the model...
Hi Jamie, thank you—I initially read Matt’s comment below as being part of this comment. So, thank you also for your astute point about the parcellation (?) of costs. Definitely needs more thought.
Yes I think Matt’s point is a specific example of what you might find if you split out (parcellate) the different forms of cost and assess how each is affected by the intervention. I was thinking, for example, that court or police costs are not divided by three by reducing the duration of the abuse by 3x, because they aren’t dealing with one third of the perpetrator.
I think your assumptions around the costs and their even distributions over three years would need to be refined a bit more to work out more precisely the areas in which the proposed intervention would or would not reduce costs. To my reading of the research you cite here, the costs include things such as prevention programs and and police, court, and prison costs in dealing with the perpetrator etc., as opposed to just costs experienced by the victim (which I think you are right are also not just linearly experienced over the years). I therefore think it would be useful parcellate out more specifically which aspects of the costs you think would be reduced.
This is a good point. I may be misinterpreting the cited research, but if the proposed training increases disclosures of CSA, that will (a) presumably reduce ‘costs as a consequence’ (which includes a monetised value of the physical and emotional harm suffered) but (b) plausibly increase ‘costs in response’ (due to increased police, prison, and safeguarding costs)
That’s exactly the kind of nuance I was hoping to get. Sharp by name, sharp by nature! Yes, if there are increased disclosures then it follows that costs as a response will go up. However, that in turn could have a deterrent effect.
If it would turn out that the response costs outweigh the savings, then from a purely costs perspective, the most cost efficient thing could be to… do nothing. Don’t try to prevent CSA once the harm is already there.
Response costs should probably be treated as either neutral or as part of the justice system’s baseline functioning, rather than as part of the marginal calculation. Which, of course, would change the model...
Hi Jamie, thank you—I initially read Matt’s comment below as being part of this comment. So, thank you also for your astute point about the parcellation (?) of costs. Definitely needs more thought.
Yes I think Matt’s point is a specific example of what you might find if you split out (parcellate) the different forms of cost and assess how each is affected by the intervention. I was thinking, for example, that court or police costs are not divided by three by reducing the duration of the abuse by 3x, because they aren’t dealing with one third of the perpetrator.
Got it, thank you. Yes, that’s a good next step as I can estimate at which point each category of costs comes into effect.