Thanks Telofy, that makes sense, but I was referring more to the fact that Will seems to argue that carbon offsetting is good but meat offsetting is completely different and wrong. All I’m saying is that I think they’re more or less the same, one is just more damaging than the other.
The difference between carbon offsetting and meat offsetting is that carbon offsetting doesn’t involve causing harms, while meat offsetting does.
Most people would consider it immoral to murder someone for reasons of personal convenience, even if you make up for it by donating to a ‘murder offset’, such as, let’s say, a police department. MacAskill is saying that ‘animal murder’ offsetting is like this, because you are causing harm to animals, then attempting to ‘make up for it’ by helping other animals. Climate offsets are different because the offset prevents the harm from occurring in the first place.
Indeed, murder offsets would be okay from a purely consequentialist perspective. But this is not the trolley problem, for the reason that Telofy explains very well in his second paragraph above. Namely, the harmful act that you are tempted to commit is not required in order to achieve the good outcome.
Thanks Telofy, that makes sense, but I was referring more to the fact that Will seems to argue that carbon offsetting is good but meat offsetting is completely different and wrong. All I’m saying is that I think they’re more or less the same, one is just more damaging than the other.
The difference between carbon offsetting and meat offsetting is that carbon offsetting doesn’t involve causing harms, while meat offsetting does.
Most people would consider it immoral to murder someone for reasons of personal convenience, even if you make up for it by donating to a ‘murder offset’, such as, let’s say, a police department. MacAskill is saying that ‘animal murder’ offsetting is like this, because you are causing harm to animals, then attempting to ‘make up for it’ by helping other animals. Climate offsets are different because the offset prevents the harm from occurring in the first place.
Indeed, murder offsets would be okay from a purely consequentialist perspective. But this is not the trolley problem, for the reason that Telofy explains very well in his second paragraph above. Namely, the harmful act that you are tempted to commit is not required in order to achieve the good outcome.