Executive summary: The doctrine of the double effect (DDE) provides a framework for evaluating the moral permissibility of actions based on intentions and consequences, but has limitations in consistently distinguishing between intended and merely foreseen outcomes.
Key points:
The DDE distinguishes between actions with intended consequences and those with foreseen but unintended consequences.
Four conditions must be met for an action with both good and bad consequences to be morally permissible under the DDE.
Applying the DDE to the trolley problem, pulling the lever to divert the trolley and kill one person instead of five can be considered morally permissible.
The DDE has limitations in clearly differentiating between intended and merely foreseen consequences in some cases.
Classifying the morality of actions based solely on intentions can be illogical when the outcomes are the same.
The distinction between omission and commission as types of “allowing” under oblique intention is not always clear-cut in determining moral permissibility.
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Executive summary: The doctrine of the double effect (DDE) provides a framework for evaluating the moral permissibility of actions based on intentions and consequences, but has limitations in consistently distinguishing between intended and merely foreseen outcomes.
Key points:
The DDE distinguishes between actions with intended consequences and those with foreseen but unintended consequences.
Four conditions must be met for an action with both good and bad consequences to be morally permissible under the DDE.
Applying the DDE to the trolley problem, pulling the lever to divert the trolley and kill one person instead of five can be considered morally permissible.
The DDE has limitations in clearly differentiating between intended and merely foreseen consequences in some cases.
Classifying the morality of actions based solely on intentions can be illogical when the outcomes are the same.
The distinction between omission and commission as types of “allowing” under oblique intention is not always clear-cut in determining moral permissibility.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.