I believe most EAs live in major cities and other densely populated areas. At least according to orthodox “prepper” doctrine, that is a massive comparative disadvantage to effective prepping for the end of the world as we know it (“TEOTWAWKI”). For most near-extinction level events, I think orthodox prepper doctrine is probably right . . . among other things, nuclear threats and pandemics are likely to hit the Bay much harder than rural Montana. There are also a lot more mouths to feed in those areas versus natural resources. So even with a fairly significant investment of time and resources, I’m not sure your median EA could realistically get to a significantly better odds of survival in TEOTWAWKI than a mildly prepared person in rural Montana (without moving of course).
That being said, most people should be able to make it at least 14 days in their own home, and have three days of supply to-go (cf. the Red Cross here, although I’d view its supply list as a starting point rather than a complete list). Having that level of preparedness across the board could certainly come in handy during various catastrophic events, as well as your garden-variety natural disaster.
Even for EAs who live in major cities, it can be helpful to cultivate good relationships with friends or extended family who live in lower-density areas, in case situations escalate (e.g. nuclear brinksmanship, pandemic intensifies) enough that it’s worth leaving the city.
In terms of prepping with supplies, it’s worth remembering that if one doesn’t have effective means to defend one’s supplies from others who might want them, one’s basically just storing up stuff that will end up being taken by others. In some countries, ‘effective defense’ just means good fences and locks; in other countries, it means AR-15s.
The best defense is often just ‘op sec’ (operational security), meaning, don’t brag about being a prepper in public, on social media, or in giving away cues of prepping (e.g. survivalist bumper stickers or house signs), which just makes one a target for others.
Your first point brings up yet another reason the Nauru proposal was ill-conceived on its face—in an active nuclear brinkmanship or pandemic situation, getting a bunch of EAs to Nauru of all places in a hurry would have been extraordinarily difficult.
If I were trying to save a bunch of EAs from a near-catastrophic event . . . the centerpiece of my plan sure wouldn’t be a bunker that was only useful with extensive advance notice.
I believe most EAs live in major cities and other densely populated areas. At least according to orthodox “prepper” doctrine, that is a massive comparative disadvantage to effective prepping for the end of the world as we know it (“TEOTWAWKI”). For most near-extinction level events, I think orthodox prepper doctrine is probably right . . . among other things, nuclear threats and pandemics are likely to hit the Bay much harder than rural Montana. There are also a lot more mouths to feed in those areas versus natural resources. So even with a fairly significant investment of time and resources, I’m not sure your median EA could realistically get to a significantly better odds of survival in TEOTWAWKI than a mildly prepared person in rural Montana (without moving of course).
That being said, most people should be able to make it at least 14 days in their own home, and have three days of supply to-go (cf. the Red Cross here, although I’d view its supply list as a starting point rather than a complete list). Having that level of preparedness across the board could certainly come in handy during various catastrophic events, as well as your garden-variety natural disaster.
Jason—good points.
Even for EAs who live in major cities, it can be helpful to cultivate good relationships with friends or extended family who live in lower-density areas, in case situations escalate (e.g. nuclear brinksmanship, pandemic intensifies) enough that it’s worth leaving the city.
In terms of prepping with supplies, it’s worth remembering that if one doesn’t have effective means to defend one’s supplies from others who might want them, one’s basically just storing up stuff that will end up being taken by others. In some countries, ‘effective defense’ just means good fences and locks; in other countries, it means AR-15s.
The best defense is often just ‘op sec’ (operational security), meaning, don’t brag about being a prepper in public, on social media, or in giving away cues of prepping (e.g. survivalist bumper stickers or house signs), which just makes one a target for others.
Your first point brings up yet another reason the Nauru proposal was ill-conceived on its face—in an active nuclear brinkmanship or pandemic situation, getting a bunch of EAs to Nauru of all places in a hurry would have been extraordinarily difficult.
If I were trying to save a bunch of EAs from a near-catastrophic event . . . the centerpiece of my plan sure wouldn’t be a bunker that was only useful with extensive advance notice.