I think EAs are broadly too quick to class things as infohazards instead of reasoning them through, but natsec seems like a pretty well defined area where the reasons things are confidential are pretty concrete .
Some examples of information that is pretty relevant to nuclear risk and would not be discussed on this forum, even if known to some participants:
How well-placed are US spies in the Russian government and in Putin’s inner circle?
How about Russian spies in the US government? Do the Russians know what the US response would be in the event of various Russian actions?
Does the US know where Russia’s nuclear submarines are? Can we track their movements? Do we think we could take them out if we had to? This would require substantial undisclosed tech. If we did know this, it would be a tightly held secret; degrading Russia’s second-strike capabilities (which is one effect of knowing where their subs are) might push them towards a first strike.
Relatedly, are we at all worried Russia knows where our submarines are?
In a similar genre, does the US know how to shoot down ICBMs? With 10% accuracy? 50%? 80%? Accuracy would have to be very good to be a game changer in a full exchange with Russia. (High accuracy would require substantial undisclosed technology, and be undisclosed for some of the same reasons plus to avoid encouraging other countries to innovate on weapon delivery.)
Does either side have other potentially game-changing secret tech (maybe something cyberwarfare-based?)
People making decisions on nuclear war planning have access to the answers to all of these questions, and those answers might importantly inform their decisionmaking.
Also, even if the secret information that decision makers have isn’t decisive there will still be a tendency for people with secret information to discount the opinions of people without access to that information.
I think EAs are broadly too quick to class things as infohazards instead of reasoning them through, but natsec seems like a pretty well defined area where the reasons things are confidential are pretty concrete .
Some examples of information that is pretty relevant to nuclear risk and would not be discussed on this forum, even if known to some participants:
How well-placed are US spies in the Russian government and in Putin’s inner circle?
How about Russian spies in the US government? Do the Russians know what the US response would be in the event of various Russian actions?
Does the US know where Russia’s nuclear submarines are? Can we track their movements? Do we think we could take them out if we had to? This would require substantial undisclosed tech. If we did know this, it would be a tightly held secret; degrading Russia’s second-strike capabilities (which is one effect of knowing where their subs are) might push them towards a first strike.
Relatedly, are we at all worried Russia knows where our submarines are?
In a similar genre, does the US know how to shoot down ICBMs? With 10% accuracy? 50%? 80%? Accuracy would have to be very good to be a game changer in a full exchange with Russia. (High accuracy would require substantial undisclosed technology, and be undisclosed for some of the same reasons plus to avoid encouraging other countries to innovate on weapon delivery.)
Does either side have other potentially game-changing secret tech (maybe something cyberwarfare-based?)
People making decisions on nuclear war planning have access to the answers to all of these questions, and those answers might importantly inform their decisionmaking.
Also, even if the secret information that decision makers have isn’t decisive there will still be a tendency for people with secret information to discount the opinions of people without access to that information.