That said, off the top of my head, philosophers who have written sympathetically about person-affecting views include Bader, Narveson (two classic articles here and here), Roberts (especially here, but she’s written on it a few times), Frick (here and in his thesis), Heyd, Boonin, Temkin (here and probably elsewhere). There are not ‘many’ philosophers in the world, and population ethics is a small field, so this is a non-trivial number of authors! For an overview of the non-identity problem in particular, see the SEP.
I agree we should be more swayed by arguments than numbers—I feel like it was you who played the numbers game first so I thought I’d play along a bit.
FYI I did reference that SEP article in my post and it says (emphasis mine):
Since the nonidentity problem became well-known through the work of Derek Parfit, James Woodward and Gregory Kavka in the early 1980s, most philosophers have accepted it as showing that at least one of the aforementioned intuitions must be false. Here, the most frequently identified culprit is intuition (1), that is, the person-based intuition itself.
I agree we should be more swayed by arguments than numbers—I feel like it was you who played the numbers game first so I thought I’d play along a bit.
FYI I did reference that SEP article in my post and it says (emphasis mine):