are basically completely formally specified (at least as much as any other approach Iāve seen, like MEC+intertheoretical comparisons).
are never fanatical with respect to your credences in theories iff you normalize theories based on the options you actually have available and so violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).
Maybe violating IIA conflicts with how you think about āuniversal domainā, and IIA is usually assumed without much comment. If you think the quality of an outcome is based entirely on the features of that outcome, and this internal quality is all that matters when comparing outcoms, then IIA should hold.
donāt require or make intertheoretical comparisons.
rank all options (outcome distributions, including fixed outcomes) for any finite set of available options when each moral theory ranks them all, too. Maybe you can extend to arbitrary size sets by normalizing each theory relative to the infimum and supremum value across options according to that theory. So, I suspect they satisfy something that can reasonably be called universal domain.
I think formal bargain-theoretic approaches (here and here) satisfy 1 and 3, arenāt fanatical, but Iām not sure about 4 and violations of IIA.
On variance voting: yeah, I think 4 is the point here. I donāt think you can extend this approach to unbounded choice sets. Iām travelling atm so canāt be more formal, but hopefully tomorrow I can write up something a bit more detailed on this.
On bargaining-theory approaches, it actually isnāt clear that they avoid fanaticism: see pp.24-26 of the Greaves and Cotton-Barratt paper you link, especially their conclusion that āthe Nash approach is not completely immune from fanaticismā. Again, I think constructive ambiguity in the way these theories get described often helps obscure their relationship to fanatical conclusions; but thereās an impossibility result here, so ultimately thereās no avoiding the choice.
Assuming all your moral theories are at least interval-scale, I think variance voting and similar normalization-based methods
are basically completely formally specified (at least as much as any other approach Iāve seen, like MEC+intertheoretical comparisons).
are never fanatical with respect to your credences in theories iff you normalize theories based on the options you actually have available and so violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).
Maybe violating IIA conflicts with how you think about āuniversal domainā, and IIA is usually assumed without much comment. If you think the quality of an outcome is based entirely on the features of that outcome, and this internal quality is all that matters when comparing outcoms, then IIA should hold.
donāt require or make intertheoretical comparisons.
rank all options (outcome distributions, including fixed outcomes) for any finite set of available options when each moral theory ranks them all, too. Maybe you can extend to arbitrary size sets by normalizing each theory relative to the infimum and supremum value across options according to that theory. So, I suspect they satisfy something that can reasonably be called universal domain.
I think formal bargain-theoretic approaches (here and here) satisfy 1 and 3, arenāt fanatical, but Iām not sure about 4 and violations of IIA.
On variance voting: yeah, I think 4 is the point here. I donāt think you can extend this approach to unbounded choice sets. Iām travelling atm so canāt be more formal, but hopefully tomorrow I can write up something a bit more detailed on this.
On bargaining-theory approaches, it actually isnāt clear that they avoid fanaticism: see pp.24-26 of the Greaves and Cotton-Barratt paper you link, especially their conclusion that āthe Nash approach is not completely immune from fanaticismā. Again, I think constructive ambiguity in the way these theories get described often helps obscure their relationship to fanatical conclusions; but thereās an impossibility result here, so ultimately thereās no avoiding the choice.