It might be the case that life will end after time T. But thatâs different than saying it doesnât matter whether life ends after time T, which a truncated utility function would say.
(But of course see theorem 4.8.1 above)
Thanks for the insight about multiverses â I havenât thought much about it. Is what you say only true in a level one multiverse?
1) Fair enough. Also, thereâs some chance we can affect Boltzmann brains that will exist indefinitely far into the future. (more discussion)
3) I added a new final paragraph to this section about that. Short answer is that I think it works for any of Levels I to III, and even with Level IV it depends on your philosophy of mathematics.
(Let me know if you see errors with my facts or reasoning.)
1) interesting, thanks!
3) I donât think I know enough about physics to meaningfully comment. It sounds like you are disagreeing with the statement âwe can plausibly only affect a finite subset of the universeâ? And I guess more generally if physics predicts a multiverse of order w_i, you claim that we can affect w_i utils (because there are w_i copies of us)?
Yes, I was objecting to the claim that âwe can plausibly only affect a finite subset of the universeâ. Of course, I guess it remains plausible that we can only affect a finite subset; I just wouldnât say itâs highly probable.
you claim that we can affect wi utils
Yes, unless the type of multiverse predicts that the measure of copies of algorithms like ours is zero. That doesnât seem true of Levels I to III.
Also, if one uses my (speculative) physics-sampling assumption for anthropics, a hypothesis that predicts measure zero for copies of ourselves has probability zero. On the other hand, the self-indication assumption would go hog wild for a huge Level IV multiverse.
Thanks Brian â insightful as always.
It might be the case that life will end after time T. But thatâs different than saying it doesnât matter whether life ends after time T, which a truncated utility function would say.
(But of course see theorem 4.8.1 above)
Thanks for the insight about multiverses â I havenât thought much about it. Is what you say only true in a level one multiverse?
1) Fair enough. Also, thereâs some chance we can affect Boltzmann brains that will exist indefinitely far into the future. (more discussion)
3) I added a new final paragraph to this section about that. Short answer is that I think it works for any of Levels I to III, and even with Level IV it depends on your philosophy of mathematics.
(Let me know if you see errors with my facts or reasoning.)
1) interesting, thanks! 3) I donât think I know enough about physics to meaningfully comment. It sounds like you are disagreeing with the statement âwe can plausibly only affect a finite subset of the universeâ? And I guess more generally if physics predicts a multiverse of order w_i, you claim that we can affect w_i utils (because there are w_i copies of us)?
Yes, I was objecting to the claim that âwe can plausibly only affect a finite subset of the universeâ. Of course, I guess it remains plausible that we can only affect a finite subset; I just wouldnât say itâs highly probable.
Yes, unless the type of multiverse predicts that the measure of copies of algorithms like ours is zero. That doesnât seem true of Levels I to III.
Also, if one uses my (speculative) physics-sampling assumption for anthropics, a hypothesis that predicts measure zero for copies of ourselves has probability zero. On the other hand, the self-indication assumption would go hog wild for a huge Level IV multiverse.