there are plausible epistemic states that might lead to such a view—for example, skepticism about the reliability of reports about the impact of distant actions. This would not be a concern if GWWC was prepared to say “and your donations have to be to charities we approve of.”
‘Plausible epistemic states’ in the sense of ‘epistemic states someone could plausibly have’ shouldn’t be conflated with ‘plausible epistemic states’ in the sense of ‘well-evidenced epistemic states’. The latter is what matters. If the evidence all suggests that GiveDirectly’s reports are accurate, then it is the responsibility of pledge-takers to take that information into account in selecting their target charity.
The pledge is normative about epistemic methodology; this is the third alternative we miss when we only consider the options ‘anything goes’ and ‘the right charity is whatever GWWC says it is’. A certain minimum threshold of reasonableness is required to follow the GWWC pledge; otherwise absolutely any cause can fit the criterion. But that threshold isn’t so high that everyone who follows it is sure to get the exact optimal answer; and it isn’t fitted such that GWWC is defined as always being in the right.
All the charities GWWC endorses as pledge-compliant must be exactly equally effective
An option you don’t consider is that “I shall give at least ten percent of what I earn to whichever organisations can most effectively use it to help people [in developing countries]” is consistent with ‘We’re too uncertain about which organization is most effective to give solid concise instructions on that front’. Taking the pledge means doing your best (or putting in a nontrivial effort) to figure out the best cause, and then giving to that cause; but as long as you end up with a non-ridiculous candidate, you’ve probably met that standard.
If the evidence all suggests that GiveDirectly’s reports are accurate, then it is the responsibility of pledge-takers to take that information into account in selecting their target charity.
Right. Given the strong mean reversion shown in intervention effectiveness I think it is not totally unreasonable to doubt that evidence. Personally I think GiveDirectly is credible but I don’t think this is the only epistemically justifiable position to take.
Taking the pledge means doing your best (or putting in a nontrivial effort) to figure out the best cause, and then giving to that cause; but as long as you end up with a non-ridiculous candidate, you’ve probably met that standard.
But the pledge isn’t merely to attempt to do so—it is to actually do it!
‘Plausible epistemic states’ in the sense of ‘epistemic states someone could plausibly have’ shouldn’t be conflated with ‘plausible epistemic states’ in the sense of ‘well-evidenced epistemic states’. The latter is what matters. If the evidence all suggests that GiveDirectly’s reports are accurate, then it is the responsibility of pledge-takers to take that information into account in selecting their target charity.
The pledge is normative about epistemic methodology; this is the third alternative we miss when we only consider the options ‘anything goes’ and ‘the right charity is whatever GWWC says it is’. A certain minimum threshold of reasonableness is required to follow the GWWC pledge; otherwise absolutely any cause can fit the criterion. But that threshold isn’t so high that everyone who follows it is sure to get the exact optimal answer; and it isn’t fitted such that GWWC is defined as always being in the right.
An option you don’t consider is that “I shall give at least ten percent of what I earn to whichever organisations can most effectively use it to help people [in developing countries]” is consistent with ‘We’re too uncertain about which organization is most effective to give solid concise instructions on that front’. Taking the pledge means doing your best (or putting in a nontrivial effort) to figure out the best cause, and then giving to that cause; but as long as you end up with a non-ridiculous candidate, you’ve probably met that standard.
Right. Given the strong mean reversion shown in intervention effectiveness I think it is not totally unreasonable to doubt that evidence. Personally I think GiveDirectly is credible but I don’t think this is the only epistemically justifiable position to take.
But the pledge isn’t merely to attempt to do so—it is to actually do it!