If so, why not generalise, and conclude you would avert 2^N h of pain of intensity 0.999^N instead of 1 h of pain of intensity 1?
I think the procedure might not be generalizable, for the following reason. I currently think that a moment of conscious experience corresponds to a specific configuration of the electromagnetic field. As such, it can undergo phase transitions, analogous to how water goes abruptly from liquid to gas at 100°C. Using the 1-dimensional quantity âtemperatureâ can be useful in some contexts but is insufficient in others. Steam is not simply âliquid water but a bit warmerâ; steam has very different properties altogether.
To extend this (very imperfect) analogy, imagine we lived in a world where steam killed people but (liquid) water didnât (because of properties specific to steam, like being inhalable or something). In this case, the claim âreducing sufficiently many units of lukewarm water would still be better than reducing a unit of steamâ would miss the point by the lights of someone who cares about death.
(Here are some thoughts on phase transitions in certain altered states of consciousness.)
Do you know how much funding is spent globally per year on preventing human torture?
I donât! Thatâs the sort of question Iâd like to see more research on (or discussed more on the Forum if such research already exists), as well as which torture-prevention orgs/âprograms are most cost-effective, etc.
Steam is not simply âliquid water but a bit warmerâ; steam has very different properties altogether.
I agree pains of different intensities have different properties. My understanding is that the Welfare Footprint Institute (WFI) relies on this to some extent to define their 4 pain categories. However, I do not understand how that undermines my point. Water and water vapor have different properties, but we can still compare their temperature. Liwekise, I think we can compare the intensity of different pain experiences even if they have different properties.
To extend this (very imperfect) analogy, imagine we lived in a world where steam killed people but (liquid) water didnât (because of properties specific to steam, like being inhalable or something). In this case, the claim âreducing sufficiently many units of lukewarm water would still be better than reducing a unit of steamâ would miss the point by the lights of someone who cares about death.
I seem to agree. Assuming water had a potential to kill people of exactly 0, and steam had a potential to kill people above 0, no amount of water would have the potential to kill as many people as some amount of steam. However, I do not think this undermines my point. When I say that âaverting sufficiently many hours of pain of a very low intensity would still be better than averting 1 h of pain of a very high intensityâ, the very low intensity still has to be higher than an intensity of exactly 0.
Thanks for your answer! :)
I think the procedure might not be generalizable, for the following reason. I currently think that a moment of conscious experience corresponds to a specific configuration of the electromagnetic field. As such, it can undergo phase transitions, analogous to how water goes abruptly from liquid to gas at 100°C. Using the 1-dimensional quantity âtemperatureâ can be useful in some contexts but is insufficient in others. Steam is not simply âliquid water but a bit warmerâ; steam has very different properties altogether.
To extend this (very imperfect) analogy, imagine we lived in a world where steam killed people but (liquid) water didnât (because of properties specific to steam, like being inhalable or something). In this case, the claim âreducing sufficiently many units of lukewarm water would still be better than reducing a unit of steamâ would miss the point by the lights of someone who cares about death.
(Here are some thoughts on phase transitions in certain altered states of consciousness.)
I donât! Thatâs the sort of question Iâd like to see more research on (or discussed more on the Forum if such research already exists), as well as which torture-prevention orgs/âprograms are most cost-effective, etc.
Thanks for clarifying.
I agree pains of different intensities have different properties. My understanding is that the Welfare Footprint Institute (WFI) relies on this to some extent to define their 4 pain categories. However, I do not understand how that undermines my point. Water and water vapor have different properties, but we can still compare their temperature. Liwekise, I think we can compare the intensity of different pain experiences even if they have different properties.
I seem to agree. Assuming water had a potential to kill people of exactly 0, and steam had a potential to kill people above 0, no amount of water would have the potential to kill as many people as some amount of steam. However, I do not think this undermines my point. When I say that âaverting sufficiently many hours of pain of a very low intensity would still be better than averting 1 h of pain of a very high intensityâ, the very low intensity still has to be higher than an intensity of exactly 0.