What does it mean for suffering/​pleasure to be measured on a linear scale, or any other scale?
What does it mean for one pain to be twice as intense as another? Maybe, from a baseline neutral state, you would be indifferent between experiencing the less intense pain for twice as long as the more intense one?
And, if we’re using a hedonistic view of utility rather than a preference-based one, we’re already skeptical of preferences, so can we justify trusting our preferences in these hypotheticals?
Interesting article Michael, thanks for linking to it. I haven’t thought much about measuring experience states before, but after briefly looking over Simon’s essay I think happiness/​suffering must, at minimum, be possible to indicate on an ordinal scale. But while many factors that lead to happiness/​suffering can probably be measured on a ratio scale (pain could be measured objectively as nociceptor activity), I doubt that how they influence valanced experience is consistent interpersonally, or even intrapersonally at different times/​conditions.
Nonetheless, I think suffering the Weber-Fechner argument can still be made if suffering/​happiness is measured on an ordinal scale. For instance, say a person is suffering immensely because of being in a lot of pain, vs. someone suffering mildly from minor pain. Our intuition would be to help the person in immense pain, but we will probably have to do much more to relieve their pain for them to even notice we’ve helped, compared to the person being in minor pain.
I’ve also just realized that intuitive problem with this argument is asymmetric, in that it indicates that we are better of doing a nice thing for somebody who has is in a neutral state vs. somebody who is already very happy which does intuitively makes sense (and is how the Weber-Fechner law is usually applied to finance—a poor person appreciates a $100 gift a lot more than a millionaire).
Does this mean that for a given link between a factor and intrinsic state (say pain to suffering), we are likely to get a greater change in subjective experience by working to improve that factor for individuals who are already close to neutral to start with? This seems counterintuitive...
What does it mean for suffering/​pleasure to be measured on a linear scale, or any other scale?
What does it mean for one pain to be twice as intense as another? Maybe, from a baseline neutral state, you would be indifferent between experiencing the less intense pain for twice as long as the more intense one?
And, if we’re using a hedonistic view of utility rather than a preference-based one, we’re already skeptical of preferences, so can we justify trusting our preferences in these hypotheticals?
More on the issue here: https://​​foundational-research.org/​​measuring-happiness-and-suffering/​​
Interesting article Michael, thanks for linking to it. I haven’t thought much about measuring experience states before, but after briefly looking over Simon’s essay I think happiness/​suffering must, at minimum, be possible to indicate on an ordinal scale. But while many factors that lead to happiness/​suffering can probably be measured on a ratio scale (pain could be measured objectively as nociceptor activity), I doubt that how they influence valanced experience is consistent interpersonally, or even intrapersonally at different times/​conditions.
Nonetheless, I think suffering the Weber-Fechner argument can still be made if suffering/​happiness is measured on an ordinal scale. For instance, say a person is suffering immensely because of being in a lot of pain, vs. someone suffering mildly from minor pain. Our intuition would be to help the person in immense pain, but we will probably have to do much more to relieve their pain for them to even notice we’ve helped, compared to the person being in minor pain.
I’ve also just realized that intuitive problem with this argument is asymmetric, in that it indicates that we are better of doing a nice thing for somebody who has is in a neutral state vs. somebody who is already very happy which does intuitively makes sense (and is how the Weber-Fechner law is usually applied to finance—a poor person appreciates a $100 gift a lot more than a millionaire).
Does this mean that for a given link between a factor and intrinsic state (say pain to suffering), we are likely to get a greater change in subjective experience by working to improve that factor for individuals who are already close to neutral to start with? This seems counterintuitive...