I appreciated these parts of Jason’s article, and am curious if others have a different take:
What to do?
The article recommends that humanity avoid creating mirror bacteria, even as a scientific experiment, no matter how tight the biosecurity around it (which can never be perfect). Funders should not fund such research; governments should even ban it.
This is a simple cost-benefit calculation. On the cost side, the threat is plausible, and the potential damage incalculable. Thus, the risk is immense. On the benefit side, there is no crucial goal for humanity that is known to be enabled by mirror life. Restricting this research would not fundamentally impede progress in biology or bioengineering generally.
Not all forms of mirror biology would even need to be restricted. For instance, there are potential uses for mirror proteins, and those can be safely engineered in the lab. The only dangerous technologies are the creation of full mirror cells, and certain enabling technologies which could easily lead to that (such as the creation of a full mirror genome or key components of a proteome).
In short, by pruning off a relatively small branch of the tech tree, we can avoid a true existential risk.
The article also recommends research to develop surveillance and countermeasures, in case humanity ever does encounter mirror bacteria. This research can be advanced significantly without creating full mirror cells.
We have time to react
Given that the threat is relatively distant, no immediate action is needed. We have time to discuss it thoroughly, among a wider set of participants. The article released today is meant to be the beginning of that wider conversation, not a call to urgent action.
I appreciated these parts of Jason’s article, and am curious if others have a different take: