While that position is possible, Kammerer does make it clear that he does not hold it, and thinks it is untenable for similar reasons that he thinks moral status is not about phenomenal consciousness. (cf. p. 8)
Interesting. I guess he would think desires, understood functionally, are not necessarily quasi-phenomenal. I suspect desires should be understood as quasi-phenomenal, or even as phenomenal illusions themselves.
If unpleasantness, in phenomenal terms, would just be (a type or instance of the property of) phenomenal badness, then under illusionism, unpleasantness could be an appearance of badness, understood functionally, and so the quasi-phenomenal counterpart or an illusion of phenomenal badness.
I also think of desires (and hedonic states and moral beliefs, and some others) as appearances of normative reasons, i.e. things seeming good, bad, better or worse. This can be understood functionally or representationally. Here’s a pointer to some more discussion. These appearances could themselves be illusions, e.g. by misrepresenting things as mattering or with phenomenal badness/goodness/betterness/worseness. Or, they could dispose beings that introspect on them in certain ways to falsely believe in some stance-independent moral facts, like that pleasure is good, suffering is bad, that it’s better that desires be satisfied, etc.. But there are no stance-independent moral facts, and those beliefs are illusions. Or they dispose the introspective to believe in phenomenal badness/goodness/betterness/worseness.
Interesting. I guess he would think desires, understood functionally, are not necessarily quasi-phenomenal. I suspect desires should be understood as quasi-phenomenal, or even as phenomenal illusions themselves.
If unpleasantness, in phenomenal terms, would just be (a type or instance of the property of) phenomenal badness, then under illusionism, unpleasantness could be an appearance of badness, understood functionally, and so the quasi-phenomenal counterpart or an illusion of phenomenal badness.
I also think of desires (and hedonic states and moral beliefs, and some others) as appearances of normative reasons, i.e. things seeming good, bad, better or worse. This can be understood functionally or representationally. Here’s a pointer to some more discussion. These appearances could themselves be illusions, e.g. by misrepresenting things as mattering or with phenomenal badness/goodness/betterness/worseness. Or, they could dispose beings that introspect on them in certain ways to falsely believe in some stance-independent moral facts, like that pleasure is good, suffering is bad, that it’s better that desires be satisfied, etc.. But there are no stance-independent moral facts, and those beliefs are illusions. Or they dispose the introspective to believe in phenomenal badness/goodness/betterness/worseness.