The Israel-Gaza situation doesn’t strike me as very neglected or tractable. The eyes of much of the world are on that situation, and it’s not clear to me that EA actors have much to add to the broader conversation. It’s also not clear to me why we would expect that actions that EA actors could take would be expected to have a significant impact on the situation.
It’s true that the Russian invasion also garnered heavy public attention. However, I’d suggest that it touched on existing EA knowledge bases (e.g., great power conflict and nuclear security) more than the Israel-Gaza situation because the potential of great powers offering military assistance against a nuclear great power was obvious. I’m not aware of any corresponding probability that great powers are going to offer arms to Hamas here.
On the funding situation, my understanding is that many crisis-relief organizations spend out of their reserves to address crises like this one, and the fundraising actually goes to replenishing their reserves for the next crisis. To the extent that is true, the counterfactual impact of donating to these organizations on Israel-Gaza relief is minimal—and donor decisions should be driven by expectations of the organizations’ effectiveness in addressing the next major humanitarian crisis. I don’t think any developments over the past few weeks would move the needle on this estimate in a meaningful way.
This analysis may not apply as much if (and likely when) the situation becomes prolonged over many months. However, the situation is rapidly unfolding, and it seems to me that limits our ability to predict the effect of giving money now that would be used in perhaps 6-9 months’ time.
There was some discussion here on what the most effective giving options might be, conditional on the donor having decided to target the Israel-Gaza situation with their donation.
It’s also possible that money isn’t the bottleneck for getting aid into Gaza. At least early on, Israeli concerns that aid could be diverted to Hamas was a limiting factor. Given the widespread public attention and concern, it’s quite possible that non-EA donors will contribute as much money as aid organizations can effectively use.
This is a non-comprehensive and lightly held view—for example, it focuses on intellectual and financial contributions. I’d be interested in hearing why you think the Israel-Gaza situation is more neglected and tractable than I tentatively think it is.
The Israel-Gaza situation doesn’t strike me as very neglected or tractable. The eyes of much of the world are on that situation, and it’s not clear to me that EA actors have much to add to the broader conversation. It’s also not clear to me why we would expect that actions that EA actors could take would be expected to have a significant impact on the situation.
It’s true that the Russian invasion also garnered heavy public attention. However, I’d suggest that it touched on existing EA knowledge bases (e.g., great power conflict and nuclear security) more than the Israel-Gaza situation because the potential of great powers offering military assistance against a nuclear great power was obvious. I’m not aware of any corresponding probability that great powers are going to offer arms to Hamas here.
On the funding situation, my understanding is that many crisis-relief organizations spend out of their reserves to address crises like this one, and the fundraising actually goes to replenishing their reserves for the next crisis. To the extent that is true, the counterfactual impact of donating to these organizations on Israel-Gaza relief is minimal—and donor decisions should be driven by expectations of the organizations’ effectiveness in addressing the next major humanitarian crisis. I don’t think any developments over the past few weeks would move the needle on this estimate in a meaningful way.
This analysis may not apply as much if (and likely when) the situation becomes prolonged over many months. However, the situation is rapidly unfolding, and it seems to me that limits our ability to predict the effect of giving money now that would be used in perhaps 6-9 months’ time.
There was some discussion here on what the most effective giving options might be, conditional on the donor having decided to target the Israel-Gaza situation with their donation.
It’s also possible that money isn’t the bottleneck for getting aid into Gaza. At least early on, Israeli concerns that aid could be diverted to Hamas was a limiting factor. Given the widespread public attention and concern, it’s quite possible that non-EA donors will contribute as much money as aid organizations can effectively use.
This is a non-comprehensive and lightly held view—for example, it focuses on intellectual and financial contributions. I’d be interested in hearing why you think the Israel-Gaza situation is more neglected and tractable than I tentatively think it is.