âSo itâs very puzzling that so many seem to find utilitarianism âdeeply appallingâ. To vindicate such a claim, you really need to trace the objectionability back to one of the two core components of the view: exclusively beneficentric goals, or instrumental rationality. Neither seems particularly âappallingââ
I think the second sentence here is probably wrong (even though I also distrust people who canât see the force of the arguments in favour of welfarist consequentialism, which are indeed strong.) Itâs normal to evaluate ideas on their entailments as well as their intrinsic appeal. For example, the t-scheme â âpâ is true iff pâ has extremely high intuitive appeal. But (as youâll know as a philosopher obviously!) when combined with other highly intuitive principles it entails that the liar sentence âThis sentence is falseâ is both true and false. Whether or not it is actually correct, it is reasonable to worry that maybe this show the t-scheme is just wrong (i.e. not all instances are true), even if you have no explanation of why it is wrong. (Though ultimately youâd want one obviously.) I think examples like this show that even apparently extremely unobjectionable claims can be reasonably doubted if their consequences are bad enough. Indeed, itâs impossible to consistently avoid thinking this, since what paradoxes like the liar or the sorites show is precisely that we canât consistently hold on to every obvious platitude involved in generating them (or even inconsistently hold on to all of them, since the law of noncontradiction is a platitude.)
Utilitarianism specifically has many consequences that sure seem like they are appalling, like that in theory one sadist torturing everyone in the world at once could be good if the sadist enjoys it enough. That seems like strong evidence against utilitarianism on its own, even though noting the appalling consequence doesnât âtrace the objectionability back to one of the two core components of the viewâ. Maybe you could argue that is enough to cast doubt on utilitarianism but not enough to justify finding it âdeeply appallingâ, but if a views entailments are enough to cast doubt on it, why couldnât they be enough to do the latter? In the case of the t-scheme, which is definitely not a stupid thing to believe in, despite the liar, the answer is âsure the consequences are bad, but itâs SO obviousâ. But itâs a substantive claim that something like that is true of utilitarianism.
The sadist example can be âtraced backââit casts doubt on a particular (hedonistic) axiology, i.e. a hedonistic interpretation of the beneficentric goals.
âSo itâs very puzzling that so many seem to find utilitarianism âdeeply appallingâ. To vindicate such a claim, you really need to trace the objectionability back to one of the two core components of the view: exclusively beneficentric goals, or instrumental rationality. Neither seems particularly âappallingââ
I think the second sentence here is probably wrong (even though I also distrust people who canât see the force of the arguments in favour of welfarist consequentialism, which are indeed strong.) Itâs normal to evaluate ideas on their entailments as well as their intrinsic appeal. For example, the t-scheme â âpâ is true iff pâ has extremely high intuitive appeal. But (as youâll know as a philosopher obviously!) when combined with other highly intuitive principles it entails that the liar sentence âThis sentence is falseâ is both true and false. Whether or not it is actually correct, it is reasonable to worry that maybe this show the t-scheme is just wrong (i.e. not all instances are true), even if you have no explanation of why it is wrong. (Though ultimately youâd want one obviously.) I think examples like this show that even apparently extremely unobjectionable claims can be reasonably doubted if their consequences are bad enough. Indeed, itâs impossible to consistently avoid thinking this, since what paradoxes like the liar or the sorites show is precisely that we canât consistently hold on to every obvious platitude involved in generating them (or even inconsistently hold on to all of them, since the law of noncontradiction is a platitude.)
Utilitarianism specifically has many consequences that sure seem like they are appalling, like that in theory one sadist torturing everyone in the world at once could be good if the sadist enjoys it enough. That seems like strong evidence against utilitarianism on its own, even though noting the appalling consequence doesnât âtrace the objectionability back to one of the two core components of the viewâ. Maybe you could argue that is enough to cast doubt on utilitarianism but not enough to justify finding it âdeeply appallingâ, but if a views entailments are enough to cast doubt on it, why couldnât they be enough to do the latter? In the case of the t-scheme, which is definitely not a stupid thing to believe in, despite the liar, the answer is âsure the consequences are bad, but itâs SO obviousâ. But itâs a substantive claim that something like that is true of utilitarianism.
The sadist example can be âtraced backââit casts doubt on a particular (hedonistic) axiology, i.e. a hedonistic interpretation of the beneficentric goals.