I think it’s important to ask why you think it’s horrible to bomb the planet into non-existence. Whatever reason you have, I suspect it probably just simplifies down to you disagreeing with the core rationale of person-affecting views.
For example, perhaps you’re concerned that bombing the plant will prevent a future that you expect to be good. In this case you’re just disagreeing with the very core of person-affecting views: that adding happy people can’t be good.
Or perhaps you’re concerned by the suffering caused by the bombing. Note that Meacham’s person-affecting view thinks that the suffering is ‘harmful’ too, it just thinks that the bombing will avoid a greater quantity of harm in the future. Also note that many people, including totalists, also hold intuitions that it is OK to cause some harm to prevent greater harm. So really what you’re probably disagreeing with in this case is the claim you would actually be avoiding a greater harm by bombing. This is probably because you disagree that adding some happy future people can’t ever outweigh the harm of adding some unhappy future people. In other words, once again, you’re simply disagreeing with the very core of person-affecting views: that adding happy people can’t be good.
Or perhaps you don’t like the bombing for deontological reasons i.e. you just can’t countenance that such an act could be OK. In this case you don’t want a moral view that is purely consequentialist without any deontological constraints. So you’re disagreeing with another core of person-affecting views: pure consequentialism.
I could probably go on, but my point is this: I do believe you find the implication horrible, but my guess is that this is because you fundamentally don’t accept the underlyingrationale.
I think it’s important to ask why you think it’s horrible to bomb the planet into non-existence. Whatever reason you have, I suspect it probably just simplifies down to you disagreeing with the core rationale of person-affecting views.
For example, perhaps you’re concerned that bombing the plant will prevent a future that you expect to be good. In this case you’re just disagreeing with the very core of person-affecting views: that adding happy people can’t be good.
Or perhaps you’re concerned by the suffering caused by the bombing. Note that Meacham’s person-affecting view thinks that the suffering is ‘harmful’ too, it just thinks that the bombing will avoid a greater quantity of harm in the future. Also note that many people, including totalists, also hold intuitions that it is OK to cause some harm to prevent greater harm. So really what you’re probably disagreeing with in this case is the claim you would actually be avoiding a greater harm by bombing. This is probably because you disagree that adding some happy future people can’t ever outweigh the harm of adding some unhappy future people. In other words, once again, you’re simply disagreeing with the very core of person-affecting views: that adding happy people can’t be good.
Or perhaps you don’t like the bombing for deontological reasons i.e. you just can’t countenance that such an act could be OK. In this case you don’t want a moral view that is purely consequentialist without any deontological constraints. So you’re disagreeing with another core of person-affecting views: pure consequentialism.
I could probably go on, but my point is this: I do believe you find the implication horrible, but my guess is that this is because you fundamentally don’t accept the underlying rationale.