There are some moral intuitions, such as the âprocreation asymmetryâ (illustrated in the âcentral illustrationâ below) that only a person-affecting view can capture.
I donât think this is exactly true. The procreation asymmetry is also consistent with any form of negative consequentialism. I wouldnât classify such views as âperson-affecting,â since the reason they donât consider it obligatory to create happy people is that they reject the premise that happiness is intrinsically morally valuable, rather than that they assign special importance to badness-for-someone. These views do still have some of the implications you consider problematic in this post, but theyâre not vulnerable to, for example, Parfitâs critiques based on reductionism about personal identity.
I donât think this is exactly true. The procreation asymmetry is also consistent with any form of negative consequentialism. I wouldnât classify such views as âperson-affecting,â since the reason they donât consider it obligatory to create happy people is that they reject the premise that happiness is intrinsically morally valuable, rather than that they assign special importance to badness-for-someone. These views do still have some of the implications you consider problematic in this post, but theyâre not vulnerable to, for example, Parfitâs critiques based on reductionism about personal identity.