If moral realism is true, I’ll give you a hundred dollars. If it’s false, I’ll burn you, your family, and a hundred innocent children alive.
You should accept this wager, since if moral realism is false then by definition it doesn’t matter whether anyone is tortured or not.
I didn’t follow the meaningfulness to the argument of the natural/non-natural distinction but from this quote it looks like your view doesn’t depend on it:
tricky objection: namely, that this deal seems bad even if you have this pattern of credences – i.e., even if non-naturalist realism and nihilism are genuinely the only live options. That is, you may notice that you don’t want to be burned alive, even if nihilism is true, and it doesn’t matter that you’re being burned alive
The perception you notice is just an intuition against moral non-realism. If moral realism isn’t true, it doesn’t matter what you want.
Disclaimer: I didn’t read the whole post
But taking just this wager:
You should accept this wager, since if moral realism is false then by definition it doesn’t matter whether anyone is tortured or not.
I didn’t follow the meaningfulness to the argument of the natural/non-natural distinction but from this quote it looks like your view doesn’t depend on it:
The perception you notice is just an intuition against moral non-realism. If moral realism isn’t true, it doesn’t matter what you want.