...Having said that, I do think the âdeeper intuition that the existing Ann must in some way come before need-not-ever-exist-at-all Benâ plausibly boils down to some kind of antifrustrationist or tranquilist intuition. Ann comes first because she has actual preferences (/âexperiences of desire) that get violated when sheâs deprived of happiness. Not creating Ben doesnât violate any preferences of Benâs.
I donât think so. Iâm sure that Roberts would, for example, think we had more reason to give Ann a lollipop than to bring Ben into existence and give him one, even if Ann would not in any way be frustrated by the lack of a lollipop.
The far more natural explanation is just that we have person-directed reasons to want what is good for Ann, in addition to the impersonal reasons we have to want a better world (realizable by either benefiting Ann or creating & benefiting Ben).
...Having said that, I do think the âdeeper intuition that the existing Ann must in some way come before need-not-ever-exist-at-all Benâ plausibly boils down to some kind of antifrustrationist or tranquilist intuition. Ann comes first because she has actual preferences (/âexperiences of desire) that get violated when sheâs deprived of happiness. Not creating Ben doesnât violate any preferences of Benâs.
I donât think so. Iâm sure that Roberts would, for example, think we had more reason to give Ann a lollipop than to bring Ben into existence and give him one, even if Ann would not in any way be frustrated by the lack of a lollipop.
The far more natural explanation is just that we have person-directed reasons to want what is good for Ann, in addition to the impersonal reasons we have to want a better world (realizable by either benefiting Ann or creating & benefiting Ben).