That’s a good point. I’d say the organ transplant case is disanalogous for basically person-affecting reasons (in the case where these contingent people don’t come to exist, they have no need or interest to further satisfy), but to evaluate this claim of disanalogy, we need to consider “the first-order question of which view is simply right on the merits”, as you say. (I’m not sympathetic to denying impartiality, though, and I don’t think it solves the problem for tradeoffs between other people.)
I find the alternatives to desire theories worse overall, based on the objections to them you raise in your article and similar ones.
Agreed.
That’s a good point. I’d say the organ transplant case is disanalogous for basically person-affecting reasons (in the case where these contingent people don’t come to exist, they have no need or interest to further satisfy), but to evaluate this claim of disanalogy, we need to consider “the first-order question of which view is simply right on the merits”, as you say. (I’m not sympathetic to denying impartiality, though, and I don’t think it solves the problem for tradeoffs between other people.)
I find the alternatives to desire theories worse overall, based on the objections to them you raise in your article and similar ones.