What do you mean by maximising average utility for existing people only? As you’ve noted, with a fixed number of people average and total utilitarianism are identical. It is only when we consider whether we should create (or destroy!) people that average and total utilitarianism come into play.
I’ve argued that if someone gets positive utility, then the universe is better when they exist. If I wanted to reduce this argument to a slogan, it would be “Good things are good”. As soon as it is accepted that average utilitarianism is flawed, most of the incentive to try to optimise things other than total utility go away. There exist a large number of strange utility functions, but the arguments for these seem to be rather unpersuasive.
Also, which parts in particular were hard to understand?
I’ve argued that if someone gets positive utility, then the universe is better when they exist.
You’ve argued that average utilitarianism is problematic, but that’s not the same as giving an actual argument that we are obligated to increase future populations.
most of the incentive to try to optimise things other than total utility go away. There exist a large number of strange utility functions, but the arguments for these seem to be rather unpersuasive.
They may not be persuasive, but they are not necessarily implausible, and the problem may be with utilitarianism in general rather than simply with average utilitarianism.
Also, which parts in particular were hard to understand?
The section titles aren’t clear and the two paragraphs under them don’t have clear lines of reasoning.
What do you mean by maximising average utility for existing people only? As you’ve noted, with a fixed number of people average and total utilitarianism are identical. It is only when we consider whether we should create (or destroy!) people that average and total utilitarianism come into play.
I’ve argued that if someone gets positive utility, then the universe is better when they exist. If I wanted to reduce this argument to a slogan, it would be “Good things are good”. As soon as it is accepted that average utilitarianism is flawed, most of the incentive to try to optimise things other than total utility go away. There exist a large number of strange utility functions, but the arguments for these seem to be rather unpersuasive.
Also, which parts in particular were hard to understand?
You’ve argued that average utilitarianism is problematic, but that’s not the same as giving an actual argument that we are obligated to increase future populations.
They may not be persuasive, but they are not necessarily implausible, and the problem may be with utilitarianism in general rather than simply with average utilitarianism.
The section titles aren’t clear and the two paragraphs under them don’t have clear lines of reasoning.
If it is good for someone to experience a life worth living, then surely we would want as many people as possible to experience this.