Interesting piece. I too reject the average view, but I’m currently in favour of prior-existence preference utilitarianism (the preferences of currently existing beings and beings who will exist in the future matter, but extinction, say, isn’t bad because it prevents satisfied people from coming into existence) over the total view. I find it to be quite implausible that people can be harmed by not coming into existence, although I’m aware that this leads to an asymmetry, namely that we’re not obligated to bring satisifed beings into existence but we’re obligated not to bring lives not worth living into existence. One way to resolve that is some form of negative-leaning view, but that has problems too so I’m satisfied with living with the asymmetry for now.
Nonetheless, I agree that the Repugnant Conclusion is a fairly weak argument against the total view.
You aren’t harmed by not being brought into existence, but there is an opportunity cost, that is, if you would have lived a life worth living, that utility is lost.
I approach utilitarianism more from a framework that, logically, I should be maximising the preference-satisfaction of others who exist or will exist, if I am doing the same for myself (which it is impossible not to do). So, in a sense, I don’t believe that preference-satisfaction is good in itself, meaning that there’s no obligation to make satisfied preferrers, just preferrers satisfied. I still assign some weight to the total view, though.
Interesting piece. I too reject the average view, but I’m currently in favour of prior-existence preference utilitarianism (the preferences of currently existing beings and beings who will exist in the future matter, but extinction, say, isn’t bad because it prevents satisfied people from coming into existence) over the total view. I find it to be quite implausible that people can be harmed by not coming into existence, although I’m aware that this leads to an asymmetry, namely that we’re not obligated to bring satisifed beings into existence but we’re obligated not to bring lives not worth living into existence. One way to resolve that is some form of negative-leaning view, but that has problems too so I’m satisfied with living with the asymmetry for now.
Nonetheless, I agree that the Repugnant Conclusion is a fairly weak argument against the total view.
You aren’t harmed by not being brought into existence, but there is an opportunity cost, that is, if you would have lived a life worth living, that utility is lost.
I approach utilitarianism more from a framework that, logically, I should be maximising the preference-satisfaction of others who exist or will exist, if I am doing the same for myself (which it is impossible not to do). So, in a sense, I don’t believe that preference-satisfaction is good in itself, meaning that there’s no obligation to make satisfied preferrers, just preferrers satisfied. I still assign some weight to the total view, though.