(Many thanks to Jesse Clifton and Sylvester Kollin for discussion.)
My arguments against precise Bayesianism and for cluelessness appeal heavily to the premise âwe shouldnât arbitrarily narrow down our beliefsâ. This premise is very compelling to me (and Iâd be surprised if itâs not compelling to most others upon reflection, at least if we leave âarbitraryâ open to interpretation). I hope to get around to writing more about it eventually.
But suppose you donât care much about avoiding arbitrariness, for any interesting interpretation of âarbitrarinessâ. Suppose you have a highly permissive epistemology. E.g., you might think that as long as your beliefs satisfy some âcoherenceâ conditions, thatâs as far as rationality can take you, and youâre free to have whichever coherent beliefs youâre disposed to. Or you might think âbeliefsâ are nothing more or less than constraints on preferences, and itâs fine if preferences are arbitrary.
If you have such a view, does that imply your credences are precise, or your preferences are complete, or the like?
No.[1] You might simply introspect on what your response to your evidence, intuitions, etc. is, and find that the most honest representation of that response is imprecise/âincomplete. You might try weighing up various considerations about the consequences of some pair of actions, and find that your disposition is, âI have no clue. Even after noticing that some precise number popped into my head, all things considered I have no preference either way (but I also donât feel indifferent, because my preferences are insensitive to mild sweetening).â
Of course, if you have a permissive epistemology and you donât have such introspective reactions, thereâs nothing more I can say to you. But itâs important to acknowledge that precision, completeness, and non-cluelessness are not some privileged default for the permissivist.
As argued here and here, imprecision and incompleteness are consistent with all the usual coherence conditions that donât straightforwardly beg the question against incompleteness.
Permissive epistemology doesnât imply precise credences /â completeness /â non-cluelessness
(Many thanks to Jesse Clifton and Sylvester Kollin for discussion.)
My arguments against precise Bayesianism and for cluelessness appeal heavily to the premise âwe shouldnât arbitrarily narrow down our beliefsâ. This premise is very compelling to me (and Iâd be surprised if itâs not compelling to most others upon reflection, at least if we leave âarbitraryâ open to interpretation). I hope to get around to writing more about it eventually.
But suppose you donât care much about avoiding arbitrariness, for any interesting interpretation of âarbitrarinessâ. Suppose you have a highly permissive epistemology. E.g., you might think that as long as your beliefs satisfy some âcoherenceâ conditions, thatâs as far as rationality can take you, and youâre free to have whichever coherent beliefs youâre disposed to. Or you might think âbeliefsâ are nothing more or less than constraints on preferences, and itâs fine if preferences are arbitrary.
If you have such a view, does that imply your credences are precise, or your preferences are complete, or the like?
No.[1] You might simply introspect on what your response to your evidence, intuitions, etc. is, and find that the most honest representation of that response is imprecise/âincomplete. You might try weighing up various considerations about the consequences of some pair of actions, and find that your disposition is, âI have no clue. Even after noticing that some precise number popped into my head, all things considered I have no preference either way (but I also donât feel indifferent, because my preferences are insensitive to mild sweetening).â
Of course, if you have a permissive epistemology and you donât have such introspective reactions, thereâs nothing more I can say to you. But itâs important to acknowledge that precision, completeness, and non-cluelessness are not some privileged default for the permissivist.
As argued here and here, imprecision and incompleteness are consistent with all the usual coherence conditions that donât straightforwardly beg the question against incompleteness.