I can see the annual probability of the absolute value of the welfare of Earth-originating beings dropping to 0 becoming increasingly low, and their population increasingly large. However, I do not think this means decreasing the nearterm risk of human extinction is more cost-effective than donating to GiveWell’s top charities, or organisations working on invertebrate welfare.
Longtermists often estimate the expected value of the future from EV = p*V = “probability of reaching existential safety”*”expected value of the future conditional on reaching existential safety”. Yet, I am not aware of any modelling (as opposed to pure guesses) showing how decreases in the nearterm risk of human extinction translate into increases in p. I am not even aware of any detailed quantitative modelling estimating changes in the risk of human extinction.
I think decreasing the probability of worlds where humans go extinct soon will barely change p, instead just making a little more likely nearby worlds where humans go extinct slighly later. The easier way to decrease the risk of human extinction in 2025 is postponing it until to 2026, not until humans and their descendents have colonised the accessible universe.
It could also be that increasing V by 1 % via donating to GiveWell’s top charities, or organisations working on invertebrate welfare is cheaper than decreasing p by 1 %, and it would be equally valuable. I estimate the absolute value of the welfare of marine arthropods is 99.99996 % (= 1 − 1/(2.50*10^6)) of that of humans and marine arthropods. So I feel like more research on improving the welfare of wild arthropods may well be a cost-effective way of increasing V.
Thanks for the good points, Ryan.
I can see the annual probability of the absolute value of the welfare of Earth-originating beings dropping to 0 becoming increasingly low, and their population increasingly large. However, I do not think this means decreasing the nearterm risk of human extinction is more cost-effective than donating to GiveWell’s top charities, or organisations working on invertebrate welfare.
Longtermists often estimate the expected value of the future from EV = p*V = “probability of reaching existential safety”*”expected value of the future conditional on reaching existential safety”. Yet, I am not aware of any modelling (as opposed to pure guesses) showing how decreases in the nearterm risk of human extinction translate into increases in p. I am not even aware of any detailed quantitative modelling estimating changes in the risk of human extinction.
I think decreasing the probability of worlds where humans go extinct soon will barely change p, instead just making a little more likely nearby worlds where humans go extinct slighly later. The easier way to decrease the risk of human extinction in 2025 is postponing it until to 2026, not until humans and their descendents have colonised the accessible universe.
It could also be that increasing V by 1 % via donating to GiveWell’s top charities, or organisations working on invertebrate welfare is cheaper than decreasing p by 1 %, and it would be equally valuable. I estimate the absolute value of the welfare of marine arthropods is 99.99996 % (= 1 − 1/(2.50*10^6)) of that of humans and marine arthropods. So I feel like more research on improving the welfare of wild arthropods may well be a cost-effective way of increasing V.