The meta-dispute here isnât the most important thing in the world, but for clarityâs sake, I think itâs worth distinguishing the following questions:
Does a specific textâThorstad (2022)âeither actually or apparently commit a kind of âbest model fallacyâ, arguing as though establishing Time of Perils hypothesis as unlikely to be true thereby suffices to undermine longtermism?
Does another specific textâmy âRule High Stakes In, Not Outââeither actually or apparently have as its âprimary argumentative move⌠to assign nontrivial probabilities without substantial new evidenceâ?
My linked post suggests that the answer to Q1 is âYesâ. I find it weird that others in the comments here are taking stands on this textual dispute a priori, rather than by engaging with the specifics of the text in question, the quotes I respond to, etc.
My primary complaint in this comment thread has simply been that the answer to Q2 is âNoâ (if you read my post, youâll see that itâs instead warning against what Iâm now calling the âbest model fallacyâ, and explaining how I think various other writingsâincluding Thorstadâsâseem to go awry as a result of not attending to this subtle point about model uncertainty). The point of my post is not to try to assert or argue for any particular probability assignment. Hence Thorstadâs current blog post misrepresents mine.
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Thereâs a more substantial issue in the background:
Q3. What is the most reasonable prior probability estimate to assign to the time of perils hypothesis? In case of disagreement, does one party bear a special âburden of proofâ to convince the other, who should otherwise be regarded as better justified by default?
I have some general opinions about the probability being non-negligibleâI think Carl Shulman makes a good case hereâbut itâs not something Iâm trying to argue about with those who regard it as negligible. I donât feel like I have anything distinctive to contribute on that question at this time, and prefer to focus my arguments on more tractable points (like the point I was making about the best model fallacy). I independently think Thorstad is wrong about how the burden of proof applies, but thatâs an argument for another day.
So I agree that there is some âtalking pastâ happening here. Specifically, Thorstad seems to have read my post as addressing a different question (and advancing a different argument) than what it actually does, and made unwarranted epistemic charges on that basis. If anyone thinks my âRule High Stakes Inâ post similarly misrepresents Thorstad (2022), theyâre welcome to make the case in the comments to that post.
The meta-dispute here isnât the most important thing in the world, but for clarityâs sake, I think itâs worth distinguishing the following questions:
Does a specific textâThorstad (2022)âeither actually or apparently commit a kind of âbest model fallacyâ, arguing as though establishing Time of Perils hypothesis as unlikely to be true thereby suffices to undermine longtermism?
Does another specific textâmy âRule High Stakes In, Not Outââeither actually or apparently have as its âprimary argumentative move⌠to assign nontrivial probabilities without substantial new evidenceâ?
My linked post suggests that the answer to Q1 is âYesâ. I find it weird that others in the comments here are taking stands on this textual dispute a priori, rather than by engaging with the specifics of the text in question, the quotes I respond to, etc.
My primary complaint in this comment thread has simply been that the answer to Q2 is âNoâ (if you read my post, youâll see that itâs instead warning against what Iâm now calling the âbest model fallacyâ, and explaining how I think various other writingsâincluding Thorstadâsâseem to go awry as a result of not attending to this subtle point about model uncertainty). The point of my post is not to try to assert or argue for any particular probability assignment. Hence Thorstadâs current blog post misrepresents mine.
***
Thereâs a more substantial issue in the background:
Q3. What is the most reasonable prior probability estimate to assign to the time of perils hypothesis? In case of disagreement, does one party bear a special âburden of proofâ to convince the other, who should otherwise be regarded as better justified by default?
I have some general opinions about the probability being non-negligibleâI think Carl Shulman makes a good case hereâbut itâs not something Iâm trying to argue about with those who regard it as negligible. I donât feel like I have anything distinctive to contribute on that question at this time, and prefer to focus my arguments on more tractable points (like the point I was making about the best model fallacy). I independently think Thorstad is wrong about how the burden of proof applies, but thatâs an argument for another day.
So I agree that there is some âtalking pastâ happening here. Specifically, Thorstad seems to have read my post as addressing a different question (and advancing a different argument) than what it actually does, and made unwarranted epistemic charges on that basis. If anyone thinks my âRule High Stakes Inâ post similarly misrepresents Thorstad (2022), theyâre welcome to make the case in the comments to that post.