Thanks for your comment. I never said it was up for debate. Rather, given that it is stipulated, I question whether agreements reached under such stipulations have any force or validity on reality, given that the stipulation is, in fact, false.
Please read my second response to brianwang712 where I imagine that Bob has a conversation with him. I would be curious how you would respond to Bob in that conversation.
I never said it was up for debate. Rather, given that it is stipulated, I question whether agreements reached under such stipulations have any force or validity on reality, given that the stipulation is, in fact, false.
The reason that the conclusions made in such a scenario have a bearing on reality is that the conclusions are necessarily both fair and rational.
Please read my second response to brianwang712 where I imagine that Bob has a conversation with him. I would be curious how you would respond to Bob in that conversation.
My reply to Bob would be to essentially restate brianwang’s original comment, and explain how the morally correct course of action is supported by a utilitarian principle of indifference argument, and that none of the things he says (like the fact that he is not Amy or Susie, or the fact that he is scared) are sound counterarguments.
1) The reason that the conclusions made in such a scenario have a bearing on reality is that the conclusions are necessarily both fair and rational.
The conclusions are rational under the stipulation that each person has an equal chance of being in anybody’s position. But it is not actually rational given that the stipulation is false. So you can’t just say that the conclusions have a bearing on reality because they are necessarily rational. They are rational under the stipulation, but not when you take into account what is actually the case.
And I don’t see how the conclusion is fair to Bob when the conclusion is based on a false stipulation. Bob is a real person. He shouldn’t be treated like he had an equal chance of being in Amy’s or Susie’s position, when he in fact didn’t.
2) “My reply to Bob would be to essentially restate brianwang’s original comment...”
Sorry, can you quote the part you’re referring to?
3) ”...and explain how the morally correct course of action is supported by a utilitarian principle of indifference argument.”
Can you explain what this “utilitarian principle of indifference argument” is?
4) “and that none of the things he says (like the fact that he is not Amy or Susie, or the fact that he is scared) are sound counterarguments.”
Please don’t distort what I said. I had him say, “The fact of the matter is that I had no chance of being in Amy’s or Susie’s position.”, which is very different from saying that he was not Amy or Susie. If he wasn’t Amy or Susie, but actually had an equal chance of being either of them, then I would take the veil of ignorance approach more seriously.
I added the part that he is said because I wanted it to sound realistic. It is uncharitable to assume that that forms part of my argument.
The conclusions are rational under the stipulation that each person has an equal chance of being in anybody’s position. But it is not actually rational given that the stipulation is false.
The argument of both Rawls and Harsanyi is not that it just happens to be rational for everybody to agree to their moral criteria; the argument is that the morally rational choice for society is a universal application of the rule which is egoistically rational for people behind the veil of ignorance. Of course it’s not egoistically rational for people to give anything up once they are outside the veil of ignorance, but then they’re obviously making unfair decisions, so it’s irrelevant to the thought experiment.
And I don’t see how the conclusion is fair to Bob when the conclusion is based on a false stipulation
Stipulations can’t be true or false—they’re stipulations. It’s a thought experiment for epistemic purposes.
Bob is a real person. He shouldn’t be treated like he had an equal chance of being in Amy’s or Susie’s position, when he in fact didn’t.
The reason we look at what they would agree to from behind the veil of ignorance as opposed to outside is that it ensures that they give equal consideration to everyone, which is a basic principle that appeals to us as a cornerstone of any decent moral system.
Also, to be clear, the Original Position argument doesn’t say “imagine if Bob had an equal chance of being in Amy’s or Susie’s position, see how you would treat them, and then treat him that way.” If it did, then it would simply not work, because the question of exactly how you should actually treat him would still be undetermined. Instead, the argument says “imagine if Bob had an equal chance of being in Amy’s or Susie’s position, see what decision rule they would agree to, and then treat them according to that decision rule.”
Sorry, can you quote the part you’re referring to?
The first paragraph of his first comment.
Can you explain what this “utilitarian principle of indifference argument” is?
It’s a stipulation of the Original Position, whether you look at Rawls’ formulation or Harsanyi’s. It’s not up for debate.
Hey kbog,
Thanks for your comment. I never said it was up for debate. Rather, given that it is stipulated, I question whether agreements reached under such stipulations have any force or validity on reality, given that the stipulation is, in fact, false.
Please read my second response to brianwang712 where I imagine that Bob has a conversation with him. I would be curious how you would respond to Bob in that conversation.
The reason that the conclusions made in such a scenario have a bearing on reality is that the conclusions are necessarily both fair and rational.
My reply to Bob would be to essentially restate brianwang’s original comment, and explain how the morally correct course of action is supported by a utilitarian principle of indifference argument, and that none of the things he says (like the fact that he is not Amy or Susie, or the fact that he is scared) are sound counterarguments.
1) The reason that the conclusions made in such a scenario have a bearing on reality is that the conclusions are necessarily both fair and rational.
The conclusions are rational under the stipulation that each person has an equal chance of being in anybody’s position. But it is not actually rational given that the stipulation is false. So you can’t just say that the conclusions have a bearing on reality because they are necessarily rational. They are rational under the stipulation, but not when you take into account what is actually the case.
And I don’t see how the conclusion is fair to Bob when the conclusion is based on a false stipulation. Bob is a real person. He shouldn’t be treated like he had an equal chance of being in Amy’s or Susie’s position, when he in fact didn’t.
2) “My reply to Bob would be to essentially restate brianwang’s original comment...”
Sorry, can you quote the part you’re referring to?
3) ”...and explain how the morally correct course of action is supported by a utilitarian principle of indifference argument.”
Can you explain what this “utilitarian principle of indifference argument” is?
4) “and that none of the things he says (like the fact that he is not Amy or Susie, or the fact that he is scared) are sound counterarguments.”
Please don’t distort what I said. I had him say, “The fact of the matter is that I had no chance of being in Amy’s or Susie’s position.”, which is very different from saying that he was not Amy or Susie. If he wasn’t Amy or Susie, but actually had an equal chance of being either of them, then I would take the veil of ignorance approach more seriously.
I added the part that he is said because I wanted it to sound realistic. It is uncharitable to assume that that forms part of my argument.
The argument of both Rawls and Harsanyi is not that it just happens to be rational for everybody to agree to their moral criteria; the argument is that the morally rational choice for society is a universal application of the rule which is egoistically rational for people behind the veil of ignorance. Of course it’s not egoistically rational for people to give anything up once they are outside the veil of ignorance, but then they’re obviously making unfair decisions, so it’s irrelevant to the thought experiment.
Stipulations can’t be true or false—they’re stipulations. It’s a thought experiment for epistemic purposes.
The reason we look at what they would agree to from behind the veil of ignorance as opposed to outside is that it ensures that they give equal consideration to everyone, which is a basic principle that appeals to us as a cornerstone of any decent moral system.
Also, to be clear, the Original Position argument doesn’t say “imagine if Bob had an equal chance of being in Amy’s or Susie’s position, see how you would treat them, and then treat him that way.” If it did, then it would simply not work, because the question of exactly how you should actually treat him would still be undetermined. Instead, the argument says “imagine if Bob had an equal chance of being in Amy’s or Susie’s position, see what decision rule they would agree to, and then treat them according to that decision rule.”
The first paragraph of his first comment.
This very idea, originally argued by Harsanyi (http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Harsanyi1975.pdf).