It seems like this may be a non-standard interpretation of illusionism. Being under illusions of consciousness isn’t necessary for consciousness according to Frankish, and what is necessary is that if a sufficiently sophisticated introspective/monitoring system were connected in to the system in the right way, then that would generate illusions of consciousness. See, e.g. his talks:
I suspect now that this is also how AST is supposed to be understood, based on the artficial agents paper.
I do wonder if this is setting the bar too low, though. Humphrey seems to set a higher bar, where some kind of illusion is in fact required, but also mammals and birds probably have them.
I think we get into a definitional problem. What exactly do mean by “illusion” or “belief”? If an animal has a “spooky” attention schema, and cognitive access to it, then plausibly the animal has beliefs about it of some kind. If an animal or system believes something is good or bad or whatever, is that not an illusion, too, and is that not enough?
Assuming illusionism is true, then yes, I think only those with illusions of consciousness are moral patients.
It seems like this may be a non-standard interpretation of illusionism. Being under illusions of consciousness isn’t necessary for consciousness according to Frankish, and what is necessary is that if a sufficiently sophisticated introspective/monitoring system were connected in to the system in the right way, then that would generate illusions of consciousness. See, e.g. his talks:
https://youtu.be/xZxcair9oNk?t=3590
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txiYTLGtCuM
https://youtu.be/me9WXTx6Z-Q
I suspect now that this is also how AST is supposed to be understood, based on the artficial agents paper.
I do wonder if this is setting the bar too low, though. Humphrey seems to set a higher bar, where some kind of illusion is in fact required, but also mammals and birds probably have them.
I think we get into a definitional problem. What exactly do mean by “illusion” or “belief”? If an animal has a “spooky” attention schema, and cognitive access to it, then plausibly the animal has beliefs about it of some kind. If an animal or system believes something is good or bad or whatever, is that not an illusion, too, and is that not enough?